53 
surface fleet grew by 108,718 tons and submarines by 50,385 tons 
from 1939 to June 1941.18 As early as 1939 the Soviet Union had 
more submarines than any other country in the world. In fact, the 
Soviet submarine fleet was larger than those of Germany and Japan 
combined.!® The task to build “the open sea and ocean navy worthy 
of Soviet Union as a great sea power” was proclaimed. Molotov’s 
statement to the First Session of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. 
that the “mighty Soviet state should have an open sea and ocean 
navy corresponding to its interests and worthy of its great tasks” 
became a slogan. Minister of Shipbuilding Industry, I. Tevosyan, writ- 
ing in Pravda’ promised to move his industry from sixth place in 
the world in 1939 to first place between 1942-48. 
The growing importance of the Soviet Navy was formally recognized 
by the establishment of an independent People’s Commissariat of the 
Navy of the U.S.S.R. in December 1937 and by the organization 
of the Main Political Directorate of the Navy and the Main Naval 
Military Council.” One of Stalin’s top lieutenants, a member of the 
Politburo and Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party, A. 
A. Zhdanov, who since the middle 1930’s had been responsible for 
naval development, was appointed as a member of the Main Naval 
Military Council.” 
During the 14 years of pre-World War I shipbuilding (1927 to 
June 1941) 433 ships (excluding torpedo and patrol boats and auxilia- 
ries) were laid down. Of that number, 312 including 206 submarines 
and 106 surface ships (4 cruisers, 7 destroyer leaders, 30 destroyers, 
18 escorts, 38 minesweepers, | minelayer, and 8 gunboats) were 
completed before the war started and commissioned. At the beginning 
of the war, 219 ships, including 3 battleships, 2 heavy cruisers, 10 
cruisers, 45 destroyers, and 91 submarines were on the building ways. 
Twenty-three submarines were completed during the second half of 
1941. 
Soviet pre-World War II naval development has been differently 
assessed at home and abroad. The main controversy has been centered 
around the role of submarines in overall naval construction and the 
theory of their combat employment. For example, some claim that 
the submarines were underevaluated in theory and practice.* Others 
came to the opposite conclusion, claiming that submarines were the 
main striking force of the Soviet Navy.”° 
It is hard to agree with either conclusion. The May 1928 decision 
of the Revvoensovet of the U.S.S.R., which discussed the role of 
navy in the military forces of the country, stated, “while developing 
the navy it is necessary to combine surface and submarine fleets, 
shore and mine position defense, as well as naval aviation in propor- 
tion corresponding to the character of combat operations.” The 
'*“Combat Path”, p. 166. 
19N. G. Kuznetsov, Pravda, July 25, 1939. 
20 Pravda, July 21 and 23, 1939. 
21““Combat Path’’, pp. 163-169. 
22N_G. Kuznetsov, ““Nakanune (on the Eve)”, Moscow, Voenizdat, 1966, pp. 221-222. 
24*“W/oenno-Istoricheskiy Zhurnal-VIZ”’ (military historical journal) No. 6, 1971, pp. 36-37. 
24“Voennaya Strategiya” (military strategy), third edition, 1968, p. 168. 
25““Combat Path”’, pp. 216 and 368. 
26“VIZ", No. 6, 1970, p. 34. 
