54 
naval development program incorporated into the second 5 Year Plan 
again emphasized close cooperation between fleet aviation and shore 
defense but some preference was shown to the development of sub- 
marines and heavy aviation. 
In the late 1930’s preference was given to surface ships, which 
were viewed as the nucleus of the navy. Submarines were supposed 
to act against enemy communications, and were viewed as the main 
forces to accomplish this task. The 1937-38 program was visualized 
as a program for the development of a balanced navy. Not a single 
Soviet pre-World War II program neglected submarine construction 
and each one planned and actually built more submarines than the 
previous one. Accelerated construction of surface ships became possi- 
ble because of new shipbuilding capacities introduced in the mid 
and late 1930’s, but by no means did it affect the construction of 
submarines. The fluctuation in the number of submarines built (6 
during the first 5 Year Plan, 137 during the second 5 Year Plan, 
and 86 during uncompleted third 5 Year Plan) is explained by the 
construction in the third period of a larger number of more so- 
phisticated classes of submarines, which obviously lengthened the 
average time for construction of one unit.?’ 
To summarize the pre-World War II development of the Soviet 
Navy, it should be stated that, with the exception of a short period 
of disgrace following the Kronstadt mutiny, considerable attention was 
devoted and effort spent to restore the available naval units, to or- 
ganize naval forces, and to incorporate them into combined all-arms 
forces. Considering the exceptionally weak Soviet economy and the 
shortage of industrial capacities—which were overtaxed, the number 
of ships built and the even larger number laid down in the pre- 
war period is remarkably high. The initiation of the 1937-38 shipbuild- 
ing program borders on adventurism, for, apart from the demands 
of the civilian sector which had been traditionally neglected, the pro- 
gram was carried out to the detriment of the other services, including 
the army. Tremendous expenditures of money, production capacities, 
and steel for the program brought little benefit to the Soviet naval 
forces. 
In 1941, the element of surprise achieved in the German attack 
on the Soviet Union and the fast advance of the German Army created 
conditions under which the traditional role of the Soviet Navy to 
support the Red Army’s maritime flanks gained overwhelming im- 
portance. While German naval activity centered mainly around the 
air and mine warfare action in the Baltic and were nearly totally 
absent in the Northern region and the Black Sea, the retreating Soviet 
fleets still took considerable losses. This did not prevent the Soviet 
Navy from fulfilling their assigned task completely, but did reduce 
their effectiveness. The Soviet Navy was neither prepared, nor was 
there any necessity created by the opponent to contest the control 
of the sea in a strategic sense. With the exception of its challenge 
to the Allied convoy system in the North, German naval activity 
was marginal. The Soviet Navy was poorly prepared for antisubmarine 
warfare. Only toward the end of the war were antisubmarine forces 
27Ibid., pp. 36-37. 
