56 
submarines. The first experimental launch of a ballistic missile from 
an obviously submerged submarine was conducted in September 
1955.2 In bombers, a considerable number of jet aircraft were 
delivered to the navy. 
Thus, during the first postwar decade, the Soviet Navy was rein- 
forced with a considerable number of newly built ships, submarines, 
and aircraft. Many old and obsolete ships were decommissioned. A 
number of ships built just prior to World War II were modernized. 
Research and development efforts resulted in a number of successes 
in the nuclear field, missilery, and electronics. The first cruise missiles 
entered the service, more missiles were under development, and some 
had even been tested. In short, prerequisites were achieved for the 
future development of a qualitatively new navy on the basis of what 
the Soviets later called the ‘scientific and technological revolution 
in the military affairs.” 
By the mid-1950’s, the Soviet Navy had become larger than any 
in the world except that of the United States, but qualitatively, particu- 
larly in the relation to the threat from the most likely opponent 
and in the relation to the tasks which it had to fulfill, the Soviet 
Navy was in no better position than that prior to World War II. 
Soviet Navy long-range forces were still in very short supply, while 
the forces for traditional mine-artillery position warfare were in 
abundance. The employment of submarines was planned independently 
from the main forces, the squadrons of surface ships, and the main 
tasks of submarines were preliminary, independent strikes against 
enemy forces.** Such forms of naval combat represented nothing more 
than the use of naval forces in the proximity of one’s own shore, 
i.e. the forms typical for a coastal navy. But it was highly problematic 
that a potential enemy would be so obliging as to bring itself into 
position and subject itself to very powerful combined gunnery torpedo 
attacks. The main limiting factor, of course, was the absence of carri- 
er-based aviation and the dependence upon land-based aviation of 
very limited radius of action (particularly fighters). It had become 
evident to the Soviet leadership, particularly to the military, that 
despite considerable resources devoted to the navy under conditions 
of a very tight economy, it was not going to fulfill its major tasks 
unless drastic changes were instituted. While apparently there was 
a mutual understanding of the necessity for change, what was desira- 
ble, was viewed differently by the various power groups. Except for 
the loud pronouncements of Khrushchev against large surface ships 
(which, considering the types the Soviet Navy had at the time, were 
basically correct) there is no indication whatsoever that the party 
leadership had turned antinavy. But some army leaders came very 
close to demanding the practical abolition of the navy, claiming that 
there were not many naval tasks (as they understood them) in which 
the army, with nuclear missiles, could not fulfill—including strikes 
against carriers (with long-range aviation) and against amphibious 
forces approaching a defense area.** Particularly strong attacks were 
launched against the surface ships and naval aviation. It was also 
claimed that the ground troops did not need the navy’s support even 
2 Ibid., p. 585. 
: ans of Naval Art”, pp. 564-565, and S. Gorshkov in ‘“‘Morskoy Sbornik”’ No. 2, 1967, pp. 
34See S. Gorshkov, “The Development of Soviet Naval Art, Morskoy Sbornik”’ No. 2, 1967, pp. 
9-21. 
