Sih 
during an amphibious operations and, thus, the amphibious ships and 
the naval infantry (marines) were obsolete and not needed.” The 
need for the submarines was never challenged by any group. 
The period of the mid 1950’s and the decisions made at the time 
resulting in “the decisive changes in the shipbuilding program in the 
direction of the creation of nuclear missile-carrying submarines, mis- 
sile-armed surface ships, and ships armed with modern antisubmarine, 
antimine, and antiaircraft weapon systems, and missile-carrying avia- 
tion” were crucial for the further development of the Soviet Navy.*° 
The post-World War II period produced a drastic shift in the nature 
of threat to the Soviet Union from a potential enemy. While before 
the war the primary threat had been posed by the continental powers, 
after the war the Soviet Union had to face the coalition of Western 
powers headed by traditional naval powers ‘in whose armed forces 
special importance had, for a long time, been attached to the navy.’*? 
The formation of NATO with the United States as the chief ally, 
elevated the significance of the naval power even more. In addition 
to the direct maritime threat to the Soviet Union, Atlantic Ocean 
communications again became the arteries through which American 
military power would be delivered but in this case as reinforcement 
to the NATO. However, by the early 1950’s except for the need 
to increase the Soviet naval forces along the familiar quantitative 
line to fulfill the traditional tasks, not much seemed to have changed 
for the Soviet Navy. 
In the early 1950’s, however, when American aircraft carriers were 
assigned the task of delivering nuclear strikes against the Soviet Union, 
the situation changed quite drastically. It became the prime task of 
the Soviet Navy to sink or even severely damage the attack carrier 
prior to the launch of the aircraft. The Soviets were convinced of 
a massive buildup in Western naval forces and the growing tendency 
to assign to the naval forces the role of one of the primary strategic 
weapons in a future war. Accordingly, the threat of an attack from 
the maritime direction had increased sharply and the defense interest 
of the country “demanded a considerable increase in the combat 
might of the Soviet Navy.’’** In short, while the Soviet shipbuilding 
industry was involved in the massive production of conventionally 
armed ships and submarines, the urgent need arose for a constructive 
revision of naval policy. 
The death of Stalin in March 1953 released the Soviet naval plan- 
ners from having to follow his arbitrary rule, and a more favorable 
atmosphere for objective discussion and evaluation of naval policy 
followed. Moreover, the physical characteristics of nuclear armament 
(size and weight) made it possible in the mid-1950’s to consider 
delivery by a variety of means. This led to the problem of selecting 
the best carriers for nuclear armament, i.e., whether aircraft (and 
in what mode of operation, land based or carrier based) or submarines 
*©““Combat Path”, pp. 545-546. 
36 Ibid., p. 547. 
37“Mforskoy Sbornik”, No. 2, 1967, p. 16. 
38 Ibid. 
