63 
Zhukov, while Minister of Defense, went a step further in the imple- 
mentation of the Edinonachaliye system. The number of political 
workers in the units was reduced, criticisms of military commanders 
during the party meetings were prohibited, and the political workers 
were made responsible not only for the state of affairs in the area 
of their immediate responsibility, i.e. party-political work, but also 
for the state of discipline and even combat readiness of the units. 
When removed from his post in October 1957, Marshal Zhukov par- 
ticularly, was severely criticized for the above steps and accused of 
attempting to undermine party political work in the armed forces. 
Until recently, and to some degree even today, the gap between 
line naval officers and political officers in general education, profes- 
sional knowledge and popularity among enlisted personnel was con- 
siderable and in favor of the line officers. 
Soviet naval development initiated a half century ago was initially 
accompanied by loud revolutionary slogans on the one hand and con- 
servative, unrealistic attempts to promote classical naval theories on 
the other. Such dichotomous views were interpreted by some Western 
students of Soviet naval affairs as testimony to the existence of two 
opposing schools in the Soviet Navy both in a perpetual struggle 
to influence Soviet leadership. In reality, however, without seriously 
objecting to debates, and occasionally even encouraging them, the 
Soviet leadership was quite pragmatic in its approach to naval con- 
struction. It could not be otherwise, for the economic conditions of 
the country and the defense requirements as seen by the Soviet leaders 
for all practical reasons excluded any other approach. This is not 
to say that the Soviet leadership impressed a deep understanding 
of naval power and skillfully implemented it, but the available options 
were very limited. 
World War I, the Revolution, and the Civil War all inflicted severe 
losses on the Russian Navy resulting in its disintegration and produced 
economic dislocation in the country. However, a number of factors 
favored the rehabilitation of the navy: The Russian naval heritage, 
which, with the notable exception of the Tsushima disaster (Russo- 
Japanese War of 1904—05), was generally glorious; the remaining ships 
and personnel, particularly a considerable number of former Imperial 
Navy officers, who, without necessarily accepting the Communist 
ideals, joined the Soviet Navy and, moved by patriotic feelings, worked 
hard; the rather extensive naval shipbuilding experience and considera- 
ble shipbuilding capacities, which would be and were restored; and 
the Soviet leadership’s preoccupation with the defense of the country. 
Long before the first Soviet tractor was built, the Soviet shipbuilding 
industry was gradually restored and the construction of naval ships, 
and first of all submarines, started. The accelerated industrialization 
of the country, strongly biased toward the defense sector, permitted 
the initiation of a number of shipbuilding programs, including the 
1937 program visualizing the construction of a “‘mighty high sea navy 
worthy of the Soviet Union.” This program far exceeded what the 
country could afford. A continuous shortage of metal, of machine 
building, and of other industrial capacities created the conditions 
wherein the implementation of the program was to the detriment 
of the other services, particularly the army. As a consequence, a 
minor war with Finland revealed the backwardness and un- 
