NAVAL POWER AND SOVIET OCEANS POLICY 
(By Michael MccGwire* ) 
Between February 1972 and February 1973, the Soviet Navy’s 
professional journal “‘Morskoj sbornik”’ (Naval Review). publiched a 
series of 11 articles over the name of Admiral Gorshkov, Commander- 
in-Chief of the Soviet Navy. The series was entitled “Navies in War 
and Peace”’ and ran out at 54,000 words, which is equivalent to 
a short book. There seems little doubt that Gorshkov’s own arguments 
are contained in these articles, and the purpose of this chapter is 
to consider what light they throw on Soviet oceans policy and the 
navy’s place in that policy. 
About 80 percent of the Gorshkov series comprises a selective 
historical analysis of ‘the role and place of navies in various historical 
eras, and at different stages in the development of military technology 
and the military art . . .”.! The articles contain a great deal of 
information, but the main thrust of Gorshkov’s argument can be sum- 
marized as follows: ” 
a. The armed forces have not lost their importance as an instrument 
of state policy, and military power continues to determine the final 
outcome of interstate interaction. 
b. The relevance and importance of navies as a means of achieving 
political objectives in peace and war is continuing to increase. The 
inherent attributes of naval forces have projected them to the forefront 
of contemporary means of combat. 
c. These same attributes lend themselves to securing a country’s 
interests beyond its borders in peacetime. Naval forces have a unique 
capacity both to demonstrate the state’s economic and military might, 
and to project military power in peacetime. 
*The author is a Professor of Maritime and Strategic Studies, at the Centre for Foreign Policy Stu- 
dies, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia. Professor MccGwire is a retired Royal Navy Com- 
mander who served in Moscow from 1956 to 1958. He is a convener of the interdisciplinary seminars 
on Soviet naval developments held annually at Dalhousie 1972-1974, and editor of the books which 
derived from them. 
"S. G. Gorshkov, “‘Navies in War and Peace,” ‘‘Morskoj sbornik”’ No. 2, 1972, p. 23, para 2. See 
also “Red Star Rising at Sea” (a translation and commentary on the Gorshkov series), United States 
Naval Institute Proceedings (USNIP), 1974, p. 3, col. 2, para 1. References to the Gorshkov series 
will be shown hereafter as: ““Msb”. Year/Issue/Page/Para; USNIP’s Page/Column/Para. 
*These points are similar to those highlighted by Weinland, the difference lying in selection and 
emphasis. In an earlier analysis, Herrick wrote: “In general, Gorshkov is arguing, all of Russian Naval 
History, both Tsarist and Soviet, evidences the vital necessity of developing and maintaining large, 
modern naval forces . . . It would require a fertile mind to turn up an argument that has not already 
been woven into the fabric of his . . . naval history . . . ”. Wooldridge comes to similar conclusions 
about the main thrust of the series. See: E. T. Wooldridge, ‘The Gorshkov Papers: Naval doctrine for 
the nuclear age’”’ in ORBIS, Winter 1975, p. 1157; R. W. Herrick, ‘The Gorshkov Interpretation of 
Russian Naval History” in MccGwire (Ed.) ‘Soviet Naval Developments: capability and context” 
(Praeger 1973), p. 306, and R. G. Weinland, “‘Analysis of Admiral Gorshkov’s Navies in War and 
Peace” in MccGwire, Booth and McDonnell (Eds.), “Soviet Naval Policy: objectives and constraints” 
(Praeger 1975), p. 551. Weinland’s analysis also appears in ‘‘Admiral Gorshkov on ‘Navies in War 
and Peace” (Center for Naval Analyses, Washington, CRC 257, September 1974), together with the 
analysis by James M. McConnell, and my own analysis. 
