80 
d. Naval strength has always been a necessary attribute of great 
power status. History shows that Russia has always suffered when 
she neglected her naval strength. For inherent reasons (geographic, 
economic, political) the Soviet Union needs a powerful navy. 
Gorshkov’s major thesis can be characterized as a contemporary 
exposition of classical seapower theory. We are, however, much less 
clear about what can be inferred from the details of his arguments, 
and more important, about the reasons which prompted the un- 
precedented publication of the series. In particular, we need to know 
whether their purpose was to announce a new or greater role for 
the navy. Or is the opposite the case, and did their publication reflect 
a major policy debate which threatened the navy’s institutional future? 
Was the series in fact seeking to justify the navy’s existing role and 
allocation of resources? Or could it even be that Gorshkov is advocat- 
ing a more powerful distant water fleet and a greater use of this 
instrument of foreign policy. 
Although there are no certain answers to these questions, we are 
likely to achieve a better understanding if we have as clear an idea 
as possible of the full context in which Gorshkov was writing. To 
that end, I start this chapter by outlining the evolution of Soviet 
naval policy since the war. I then make a rough assessment of the 
Soviet Navy’s overall situation at the time the series were written 
in 1971-72, including some attempt to perceive the type of policy- 
decisions which were approved by the 24th Party Congress in the 
spring of 1971. After that I turn to consider the substance of the 
Gorshkov series and what can be inferred from them. Next, I discuss 
whether the Soviet Union has an ‘Oceans Policy,” and what role 
her navy might play in such a policy. And finally, I look at the 
prospects for the decade ahead. 
THE EVOLUTION OF SoviET NAVAL Po icy: 1945-71 
The analysis of Soviet naval policy is best seen as an ongoing 
hypothesis. The depth of our understanding depends largely on the 
extent of our hindsight and as time goes by we gain perspective, 
fragmentary evidence begins to accumulate in meaningful ways and 
trends become clear; even more important, we are able to perceive 
the operational and hardware outcomes of decisions taken several 
years previously. The following explanation of developments since 
1945 concentrates on what seem to have been the primary determi- 
nants of Soviet naval policy. In its general outline this interpretation 
is now widely accepted by specialists in the field, for the period 
up to about 1967-68. Thereafter, as the evidence becomes more 
ambivalent and fragmentary, opinions begin to diverge, but I will 
try to indicate the range of informed assessments.* 
While Russia is predominatly a land power, for the last 200 years 
or so her navy has generally been the third or fourth largest in 
the world, although its effectiveness fluctuated widely. Russia used 
3 This section draws on my chapter ‘‘The Evolution of Soviet Naval Policy: 1960-74” in MccGwire, 
Booth and McDonnell (Eds.), ‘Soviet Naval Policy: objectives and constraints’, pp. 505-546. See 
also “The Turning Points in Soviet Naval Policy,” in MccGwire (Ed.), “Soviet Naval Developments: 
capability and context” (Praeger 1973), pp. 176-209, and “Soviet Naval Procurement” in “The 
Soviet Union in Europe and the Near East” (Royal United Service Institute, London 1970), pp. 
74-82. For convenience, I have drawn heavily on the first two books for references. 
