81 
naval forces in the 18th century to gain control of her Baltic and 
Black Sea coasts, and four times between 1768 and 1827 she deployed 
sizeable squadrons to the Mediterranean for a year or more. For 
three of these deployments ships were drawn from the Baltic Fleet 
and were used in operations against the southern side of the Black 
Sea exits during the third, fifth and sixth wars with Turkey. 
Increasingly thereafter, Russia found herself confronting predomi- 
nantly maritime powers. In the Black Sea, Britain used her naval 
strength to prevent Russian gains at the expense of the failing Ottoman 
Empire; Britain intervened directly in the seventh Turkish war 
(1853-56, Crimea), and the peace treaty forbade Russia a Black 
Sea Fleet; in the eighth Turkish war (1876-77), British pressure en- 
sured that Russia would not gain control of the Straits. In the Far 
East, Russo-Japanese rivalry culminated in a disastrous war, and the 
loss of two Russian fleets. In 1918, the Western navies provided 
essential support to the forces of counterrevolution. As a consequence, 
Russia’s naval policy was increasingly dominated by the requirement 
to defend four widely separated fleet areas against maritime powers 
who could concentrate their forces at will. The major warship con- 
struction program, which was initiated in 1945, was the fourth attempt 
in 65 years to build up a strong Russian Navy. 
1945-60 
In 1945, the Soviet Union lacked a battleworthy fleet, while its 
likely opponents were the “traditional maritime powers” who had 
recently demonstrated their capacity to project continental scale ar- 
mies Over vast distances of sea. The likelihood of maritime invasion 
of the Baltic and Black Sea coasts was considered substantial; naval 
requirements were carried over from before the war as Russia em- 
barked on rebuilding a large, mainly conventional navy, with heavy 
emphasis on “medium-type”’ submarines. 
In 1954, as a consequence of the post-Stalin reevaluation, the Soviet 
leadership downgraded the threat of seaborne invasion and gave first 
priority to the dangers of a surprise nuclear attack. This engendered 
a radical reappraisal of naval requirements and the decision to place 
primary reliance on long-range cruise missiles, to be carried by small- 
to-medium surface ships, diesel submarines and aircraft. The opera- 
tional concept relied on the reach and payload of these weapons 
(which had still to be developed), to substitute for tactical mobility 
and large numbers of ships. This would also allow resources to be 
released from warship construction to the domestic economy. 
Khrushchev brought 45-year-old Gorshkov to Moscow to implement 
these decisions, which had been strongly opposed by the Commander- 
in-Chief of the Navy (Kuznetsov), whom he replaced in early 1956. 
The building of cruisers was checked in midcourse, the mass produc- 
tion of medium-type submarines was sharply tapered to a halt, and 
while the destroyer escort, and subchaser programs ran their full 
course, their successor classes were put back 4 years. Seven of the 
thirteen largest building ways were reassigned to the construction of 
fish-factory and merchant ships. 
The new concept of operations was predicated on engaging the 
enemy carrier groups within range of shore-based air cover and envi- 
