82 
sioned a coordinated missile attack by strike aircraft, diesel submarines 
and light cruisers. These newly-designed units would begin to eater 
service in 1962. If the decisions taken in 1954 had been fully imple- 
mented, the result would have been a task-specific, defensively 
oriented navy, more firmly tied to home waters than at any time 
since the 1930’s, with strategic delivery submarines as the sole excep- 
tion. 
However, by 1958 the basic premise that shore-based air support 
would be available over the encounter zone, had been falsified by 
increases in the range of carrier-borne aircraft; this allowed U.S. car- 
riers to strike at Russia with nuclear weapons from the eastern 
Mediterranean and south Norwegian Sea. To meet this threat from 
distant sea areas it was decided to rely on nuclear submarines, and 
plans to double the latters’ production were put in hand, with deliv- 
eries due to begin in 1968. The cruise-missile diesel submarine pro- 
grams were canceled and as an expedient, their missile system was 
used to reconfigure the second generation of ballistic-missile units 
to SSGN. The decision to gamble on long-range surface-to-surface 
cruise missiles (SSM) as the primary armament of the fleet (a mistake 
which the Soviet Navy is only now finally working out of its system) 
was reversed, and the development of a horizon-range submarine 
system with organic target-location was put in hand. 
At this same period the requirement for a sea-going helicopter- 
platform to extend the range of airborne ASW coverage in arctic 
waters generated the decision to build the Moskva class helicopter 
carrier, which the Soviets classify as an antisubmarine cruiser. 
1961-SHIFT TO FORWARD DEPLOYMENT 
Contemporary Soviet naval policy stems from 1961, and President 
Kennedy’s abrupt acceleration of U.S. procurement of strategic 
weapons.’ Soviet leaders were unpersuaded that this United States 
buildup of land-based and submarine-launched strategic missiles was 
a purely “defensive” move, and were seriously concerned that Amer- 
ica was seeking to develop the capability for a disarming strike. The 
shift in Soviet “strategic-weapons”’ policy can be dated to this period.° 
It involved a fourfold increase in the production of ICBM, together 
with a reversal of the trend towards larger warheads and area devasta- 
tion, in favor of point targetting. But the effects on Soviet naval 
policy were even more fundamental. 
At least until comparatively recently, Soviet military doctrine has 
not separated “nuclear deterrence” from the general concept of de- 
fence. Defense of the Soviet Union has relied on the capability to 
throw back any attack by the West, and then go on to win what 
would inevitably be a world war between two antagonistic social 
4This included the sharp acceleration of the Polaris program and a doubling of the planned 
production rate of the new Minuteman solid-fueled ICBM, which was then completing development. 
The construction of 14 Polaris had been authorized progressively during the 3 years 1958-60. On 
Jan. 29, 1961, Kennedy authorized the construction of a further 27, of which 15 were to start build- 
ing within 6 months. Minuteman and the earlier Titan II were to be deployed in underground silos 
remote from existing centres of population. At the beginning of 1962 it was announced that there 
would be 800 Minutemen in service by 1967, but in practice 800 missiles were already deployed by 
1965: a further 200 missiles were added by mid-1967. The 1962 edition of V. D. Sokolovskij’s 
“Voennaya Strategiya” (military strategy) makes specific reference to this increase in the rate of 
production; see pp. 102-105. 
5See My “Soviet Strategic Weapons Policy: 1955-70” in “Soviet Naval Policy,” pp. 486-502. 
