83 
systems. Since ‘world war” is seen as a fight to the finish, victory 
is synonymous with survival, and it is in such circumstances that 
Europe must occupy a very special place in Soviet military strategy. 
In the initial stages of such a war, the extent to which Western 
Europe is devastated will largely depend upon the Soviet choice of 
weapons. It is the potential availability of this adjacent and partly 
undamaged area on which to rebuild the Socialist System, that has 
allowed Russia to plan on the assumption that if “world war” were 
to be forced on her, it need not imply mutual suicide. And it was 
in this context that the major shift in the U.S. emphasis toward 
seaborne strategic nuclear weapons was so disturbing. These weapons 
were the only ones which, if withheld, would have some certainty 
of surviving the initial exchange and remain available to deny Russia 
the use of Europe to rebuild her social system. 
The simplest way of countering this threat to the ultimate survival 
of the Soviet system was to remove the U.S. option of withholding 
these weapons, by making it unlikely that they would, in the event, 
survive. This required that they be attacked at the outbreak of war 
and meant that Soviet forces would have to be within weapon-range 
contact at the vital moment; i.e., they must already be deployed 
in the sea areas of threat. 
The shift to forward deployment appears to have been decided 
in principle by the end of 1961, but the debate about means continued 
until 1963-64. It would seem that the operational concept which 
finally emerged was to extend the Soviet Union’s maritime defense 
perimeters to cover the sea areas from which nuclear strikes could 
be launched and, by establishing an increasingly active presence in 
these areas, first to contest and, perhaps, ultimately to deny their 
use by the West for the deployment of strategic weapons. Meanwhile, 
a capability would be developed to follow the movement of all 
strategic delivery units when they sailed from their U.S. bases. 
These measures would have to be introduced progressively over 
the following 10-15 years, as the necessary weapon systems and forces 
became available through a process of major conversion, modified 
new construction and, finally, new design and development. To 
achieve economy in numbers, the shift to forward deployment (which 
may have been seen in part as an interim expedient) was predicated 
on naval shore facilities being available in the forward operating areas. 
Countering forces were not limited to the navy and it seems likely 
that shore-based systems, including satellites and ballistic missiles, were 
taken into account from the start. 
In 1961 the Soviet Navy was ill-prepared to meet these new require- 
ments. There are no indications that it had been straining at the 
political leash while preparing itself for an oceanic role through local 
operations and training, and given the existing balance of forces at 
sea, there can be little doubt that the decision to move forward 
in strategic defense reflected national strategic imperatives, rather than 
long-stifled naval aspirations. Bearing in mind the high level of tension 
and the general tenor of the Western strategic debate at that time, 
the concept of relying on “the protection of peace” to safeguard 
ships in distant sea areas has more attraction after 10 years of success- 
ful experience, than it would have had in 1961-63. 
69-315 O - 76 -- 7 
