84 
In terms of operational deployment, the ordering of priorities would 
have been fairly clear. Set at 1,500 n.m. (the range of the Polaris 
A-2) and centered on Moscow,® the dividers took in the Norwegian 
Sea and eastern Mediterranean—areas in which Western strike forces 
were already operating in 1961. Extended to 2,500 n.m. (the A-3 
range), the dividers reached beyond the tip of Greenland, described 
an arc through the eastern Atlantic which cut the African coast about 
the Canary Islands, and then crossed the Arabian Sea between the 
Horn of Africa and Bombay. That was the extent of the area-defense 
problem in 1964. There was also the need to cover the fleet bases 
on the coast of North America and the transit routes to the operating 
areas. 
1961-67 
The initial phases lasted through 1967. The first significant Soviet 
naval exercise in the Norwegian Sea took place in 1961 and became 
an annual event. It grew steadily in scale, scope and complexity involv- 
ing the Baltic and Northern Fleets in a series of related exercises 
within the general scenario of defending an extended fleet-area. Soviet 
naval operations in the Norwegian Sea were progressively more 
frequent, with a rising emphasis on ASW, and it became standard 
practice for Northern Fleet units to deploy whenever any significant 
Western naval force operated in the area. The perimeter of the Soviet 
maritime defense zone was pushed out to the Greenland-Iceland-U.K. 
Gap, with submarines stationed further forward in the Atlantic ap- 
proaches. 
A sustained presence in the Mediterranean was not attempted until 
1964. Thereafter there was a gradual buildup in numbers and length 
of deployment, but operational activity remained low and in the 
absence of shore support, it was not possible to maintain deployment 
throughout the winter months. Preliminary approaches to persuade 
Egypt to allow access to her ports had been made as early as 
December 1961, but despite increasing pressure from Russia, Nasser 
refused to concede. However, the 1967 Arab-Israeli war reduced 
Egypt to a supplicant and the Soviet Navy gained access to port 
facilities and to the all-important airfields.‘ The average length of 
individual deployment almost doubled, numbers on station in the 
Mediterranean rose sharply and for the first time a naval presence 
was maintained over the winter months. Since 1968, Western carriers 
have always been marked when in the eastern basin and nearly always 
when elsewhere in the Mediterranean. Soviet units intermingle with 
the Sixth Fleet’s amphibious operational deployments and most 
Western exercise activity. Their own exercises are held in the eastern 
basin, a main emphasis being on ASW with a special interest in 
the problems of controlling the basin’s approaches. Access to Egyptian 
port facilities was covered by a S-year agreement signed in March 
1968 and renewed in 1973, but when Soviet forces were asked to 
61 take Moscow as the center of the circle, in part because this was the standard way of presenting 
the prevailing situation in Western journals of that period; that is, Western strategic delivery forces 
located on concentric circles, with Moscow at the bullseye. This would also have been the perspec- 
tive of a Soviet military planner, and of course the defense of Moscow has always been given special 
priority by the Soviet leadership. 
7See “The Mediterranean and Soviet Naval Interests” in ‘Soviet Naval Developments” pp. 
344-357. For a somewhat different emphasis, see R. G. Weinland’s “Soviet Transits of the Turkish 
Straits, 1946-70,” pp. 325-344 in the same book. 
