85 
leave Egypt in July 1972, the navy lost the use of their supporting 
airfields.*® 
1968-72 
The second phase of the move forward, which began in 1968, 
took in the 2,500 mile circle-of-threat and also addressed the problem 
of the fleet bases in North America and their transit routes across 
the Atlantic. March 1968 saw the first Soviet deployment to the 
Indian Ocean and by the end of 1968, Somalia was being fostered 
as the point d’appui in the area, with Berbera serving as the main 
forward base and Aden as an alternative. Soviet suspicions concerning 
the Arabian Sea as a potential launch-area for Polaris submarines ® 
had been fed by the 1963 agreement to build a U.S. Navy VLF 
communications station at North West Cape in Australia, which could 
only be interpreted as developing the capability to communicate with 
submerged submarines in the Indian Ocean. These suspicions would 
have been reinforced by the 1966 agreement on the combined 
U.S./U.K. use of Diego Garcia, with the United States paying for 
the costs of developing the base.!° 
July 1969 saw the first Soviet deployment in the Caribbean, includ- 
ing a visit to Cuba. In September 1970, barges used in the support 
of nuclear submarines were delivered to Cienfuegos from the Northern 
Fleet and rest and recreation facilities were built ashore. Since then, 
Soviet naval detachments (usually including submarines and/or a 
tender) have visited Cienfuegos and Havana regularly. In April-May 
1970, Northern Fleet aircraft refuelled in Cuba before returning to 
Russia, and in September 1972 they flew reconnaissance of the 
Western Atlantic from Cuban airfields. The Soviet Navy has 
meanwhile been probing U.S. reactions to the use of Cienfuegoes 
as a forward operating base, which would bring them considerable 
advantage in terms of covering Norfolk and Charleston, the main 
bases for U.S. aircraft carriers and Polaris submarines. Instead of 
having to spend 20 days in transit from their Northern Fleet bases, 
Soviet submarines operating out of Cuba would be within 2 days’ 
run of the attachment area.! 
On the opposite side of the Atlantic, February 1969 saw the first 
Soviet naval visit to Conakry in Guinea, which provided support to 
Sekou Toure’s regime at a critical juncture. The Guinea Patrol was 
established in December 1970, after an attempted coup sponsored 
by Portugal; this earned further favor with Toure and also with the 
PAIGC, who were the likely inheritors of the Cape Verde Islands, 
“See G. S. Dragnich’s ““The Soviet Union’s Quest for Access to Naval Facilities in Egypt Prior to 
the June War of 1967” in “Soviet Naval Policy” pp. 237-277. Dragnich’s analysis highlights the per- 
sistence of Soviet efforts and the costs they were willing to shoulder to obtain this access. 
*Soviet concern for the Indian Ocean as a Polaris patrol area goes back at least to 1960. See arti- 
cle by I. Isakov in Izvestia, 7 November 1960, p. 5, which quotes a Time Magazine article (1 August 
1960), as saying that Polaris will be stationed in the Indian Ocean. The Arabian Sea provides better 
target coverage of Russia and China than any other sea area. 
See “The Pattern of Soviet Naval Deployment in the Indian Ocean, 1968-71” in “Soviet Naval 
Developments” pp. 425-441, particularly note 21. For a different viewpoint see J. M. McConnell’s 
“The Soviet Navy in the Indian Ocean,” pp. 389-406 in the same book. 
See “Soviet Naval Interests and Intentions in the Caribbean” in “Soviet Naval Developments” 
pp. 470-488. For a different perspective, see B. Blechman and S. Levinson, “Soviet Submarine Visits 
to Cuba” in “United States Naval Institute Proceedings,’ September 1975, pp. 30-39. 
