87 
backs in naval construction resulting from the 1954 decisions and 
further disruption resulting from the reversal of plans in 1957-58. 
About the only thing going the navy’s way at this time was the 
previous decision to double the production capacity of nuclear 
submarines, which meant that by 1968, 10 would be delivered an- 
nually . . . but that was still 7 years ahead. 
The debate about means, which lasted until 1963-64, appears to 
have concentrated mainly on the role of surface ships against the 
Polaris submarine; in particular, on the requirement for a cruiser- 
sized class, and on the continued usefulness of antisubmarine 
helicopter carriers now that the geographical scenario had changed. 
These requirements appear to have been conceded only grudgingly, 
and in meeting them the navy had to make do with its existing 
building capacity, which it achieved by dropping the escort-ship from 
its inventory, and moving each ship-type down one yard to make 
room for cruiser construction. Meanwhile, major modification pro- 
grams were authorized to convert existing classes of destroyer-sized 
ships to effective antisubmarine vessels, and to fit them with a strong 
self-defence capability to withstand a preemptive strike. 
As this policy took effect, the result has been a growing distinction 
between the type of surface ship intended to operate in distant waters, 
and those assigned to the defense of fleet areas. The latter task can 
be discharged by relatively small, missile-armed units, supported by 
shore-based weapon systems and sensors. In contrast, ships on distant 
deployment must be able to carry out their mission in a hostile en- 
vironment without external support; this requires a hull large enough 
to carry self-sufficient defense systems as well as those designed for 
the primary task, and implies a destroyer-size or larger ship. Those 
classes (new and modified) which have entered service since 1965, 
have had these characteristics. Their primary mission is indicated by 
their Soviet designator of “large antisubmarine ship.” There is also 
some negative evidence to suggest that their main missile armament 
may be antisubmarine rather than surface-to-surface,’ although it 
could possibly be a dual-purpose system. Meanwhile, the layout of 
their gun systems suggests concern for a coordinated surprise attack, 
and the overall characteristics of these ships implies that they have 
been designed for a short, concentrated engagement, rather than for 
sustained operations in a hostile environment.” 
~ Unless the SS-N-10 has an antisubmarine capability, there is a glaring absence of any rapid- 
response long-range antisubmarine weapon system in these ships. The Moskva, which is designated an 
antisubmarine cruiser and was delivered before the other classes, carries an antisubmarine missile 
launcher, which meets this requirement; Kuril is also reported to carry such a launcher (Janes 
1975-76). A weapon system therefore exists, and one would expect it to be carried by other large 
antisubmarine ships. It seems probable that this is in fact the case and that the only difference is in 
the launching system and stowage. The Moskva-type has a reload capability, whereas the Kara, Kresta 
Il and Krivak do not, and the SS—N-10 launchers double as missile stowage. Supporting evidence is 
offered by the Kashin modification, which involves (inter alia): (a) fitting variable depth sonar and 
four after-facing missile launching cylinders, and (b) removing the after-facing 6-barrelled antisub- 
marine rocket launchers. The latter have been fitted to all large antisubmarine ships since 1962, in- 
cluding the most recent Kara (Janes 1975-76). Outwardly, the cylinders are similar to those in Osa I] 
(SS-N-11), but it would seem more likely that they fulfill somewhat the same role as the antisub- 
marine rocket launchers they replaced. Finally, there is the matter of tasking and threat. If the 
SS—N-10 is an SSM system, are all these ships intended for use against the carrier, a target which is 
already well covered by submarines and aircraft? If not, what surface target do they have in mind? 
Western navies generally lack a surface-to-surface capability, and the threat to Soviet surface units is 
from submarines and air strike. 
'SSee J. W. Kehoe’s “Warship Design: Ours and Theirs” in “United States Naval Institute 
Proceedings”, August 1975, p. 64, “Summary.” 
