88 
On the submarine side, the major impact of the 1961 threat reassess- 
ment was to change the configuration mix of the new family of nuclear 
submarines which were due to begin delivery in 1968, emphasis being 
shifted from attack to ballistic missile units. Meanwhile, the develop- 
ment of new submarine tactical weapon systems was put in hand, 
for fitting in the third generation of nuclear hull/propulsion units, 
scheduled to begin delivery in 1977-78. 
THE ROLE OF STRATEGIC DELIVERY: 1945-72 
So far, I have concentrated entirely on the task of countering the 
West’s maritime capability, and we must now go back to review the 
role of Soviet strategic delivery submarines. This role stems from 
three sources: (1) The Russian Navy had a long and successful tradi- 
tion of attacking warships in port, which was carried over into Soviet 
naval doctrine; (2) at the end of the war, the diesel-submarine/torpedo 
was the only delivery system available with the range and payload 
to bring atomic weapons to bear on the North American continent, 
and (3) Soviet military doctine sees strategic nuclear weapons as 
the main force within a general war-fighting capability, on which 
Russia bases her defense. Taken together, this has meant that although 
the Soviets were the first to systematically exploit the submarine’s 
potential for strategic delivery, the operational requirements were very 
different to those underlying the Polaris concept. 
In the postwar period, Soviet strategic delivery submarines were 
given top priority in nuclear propulsion, warheads and ballistic mis- 
siles. Despite this, advances in U.S. antisubmarine capabilities, coupled 
with Soviet technological inadequacies, meant that the first generation 
of series production classes, which began delivery in 1958,'° were 
unable to meet the planned operational requirements. In 1958, priority 
was therefore shifted away from strategic delivery, and nuclear 
hull/propulsion units were reassigned to the counter-carrier role.’® As 
a further consequence it seems likely that, despite the doubling of 
the nuclear submarine building capacity, which would start delivering 
10 units a year from 1968, it was originally planned that only two 
of these would be configured as ballistic missile units (Y-Class).!7 
However, the new threat of a disarming strike which emerged in 
1961, gave renewed priority to seaborne systems. As a result, the 
SSBN production rate was raised from 2 to 6 per annum, at the 
expense of other configurations. 
Meanwhile, there were progressive advances in missile systems in- 
cluding a steady increase in range: 1957—350 n.m., 1962—650 n.m., 
1967—1300 n.m. and 1972—4200 n.m. While the first increase in 
range can be seen as routine design improvement, the second and 
third steps were almost certainly influenced by progressive improv- 
ments in the U.S. Navy’s antisubmarine capability. The third step 
(which stems from the 1961 period) is particularly significant; this 
threefold increase in range allowed ballistic-missile submarines to 
‘5 There were two diesel and two nuclear classes, one of each being armed with nuclear torpedoes 
(F- and N-Classes), the other being armed with the SS-N-4, 350 n.m. surface-launch ballistic missile 
(G- and H-Classes). rn 
'6The E Il Class. See p. 185 of “The Turning Points of Soviet Naval Policy”, in “Soviet Naval 
Developments.” 
See p. 431 of “Current Soviet Warship Construction and Naval Weapons Development” in 
“Soviet Naval Policy.” 
