89 
strike at North America from the comparative safety of home-fleet 
antisubmarine defense zones. 
These developments in missile capability were reflected in the task 
assigned to these submarines. The first generation units, which were 
armed with the two earlier systems, were limited to contributing to 
the naval task of attacking maritime communications, by means of 
strikes at naval bases and port complexes.'* The entry into service 
of the 1300 n.m. system allowed the missile submarine (Yankee) 
to be linked with the Strategic Rocket Forces, as comprising the 
“main force for deterring the aggressor and decisively defeating him 
in war. !% And with the advent of the 4200 n.m. system deployed 
in home waters, Gorshkov was able to claim that because of their 
greater survivability, submarine-launched ballistic missiles were a more 
effective deterrent than the ICBM.”° 
PEACETIME EMPLOYMENT OF SOVIET NAVAL FORCES 
The great increase in the range, payload and accuracy of modern 
weapons has allowed the deployment of strategic nuclear delivery 
systems aboard warships, which in turn has drawn forces forward 
to counter them. In consequence, a substantial number of naval units 
from both sides now continually carry out in peacetime what are 
essentially wartime tasks, such as SSBN patrols, antisubmarine surveil- 
lance, and the marking of aircraft carriers. 
However, the shift to forward deployment also provided the Soviet 
Union with opportunities to exploit the presence of their naval forces 
in distant sea areas for political advantage. It coincided with a distinct 
hardening of Soviet attitudes toward the United States and the latter’s 
overseas involvements, which occurred between the fall of Khrushchev 
and the middle of 1965.7’ The resultant policy was the product of 
many different factors, but in terms of this analysis, the following 
may have had particular relevance; the availability of the 2500 n.m. 
A-3 Polaris system for deployment in the eastern Mediterranean;” 
the public announcement of the Poseidon program in January 1965;?5 
U.S./U.K. discussions about establishing a base at Diego Garcia 
in the Indian Ocean; the failure of the Soviet Union’s U.N. proposal 
in December 1964, that the Mediterranean and Indian Oceans should 
be declared nuclear free zones; the increasing U.S. involvement in 
Vietnam and the bombing of Hanoi during Kosygin’s visit in February 
1965; and the growing rift between Russia and China. 
These developments had two kinds of implications for the Soviet 
Union. On the one hand, there was a continued growth in the strategic 
threat to Russia from distant sea areas, both in terms of the range 
of sea-based nuclear weapons and the areas from which they could 
be launched. And on the other hand, the Soviet leadership was moving 
(perhaps reluctantly) into a position of having to react more positively 
against American overseas involvements, which were “smothering na- 
**V_ D. Sokolovskij, ““Voennaya Strategiya’’, Voenizdat, Moscow, 1963, p. 400. 
9 Ibid., 1968 edition, p. 235. 
*0““Morskoj sbornik’’, February 1973, p. 21. 
21T. W. Wolfe, “Soviet Power in Europe” (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971) p. 266. 
2Qn 5 September 1964, President Johnson announced that the A-3 system would be deployed 
later that month. 
23The Soviet Union would have been aware of this program before this date. 
