90 
tional liberation movements.” *4 From the naval viewpoint, these impli- 
cations were mutually reinforcing. The shift to forward deployment 
had as its primary purpose the countering of U.S. strategic delivery 
units. This was to be achieved in part by extending the maritime 
defense zones to take in such areas as the eastern Mediterranean, 
in order to contest their unhindered use by Western navies. But these 
same forces would also be available to impede the traditional use 
of Western naval power to project military force in distant parts 
of the globe, and where possible, they could provide support to Soviet 
proteges. 
This line of reasoning led to a significant elaboration of the func- 
tions of forward deployment. In certain limited areas, besides shadow- 
ing nuclear strike units, Soviet naval forces were to contest the West’s 
unhindered use of the sea for the projection of military power. This 
new assertive policy may have been outlined at the 23rd Party Con- 
gress in March 1966,” but it did not become operationally apparent 
until 1967, perhaps because several new classes of warships were 
due to begin delivery about then. In April 1967, Brezhnev demanded 
the withdrawal of the Sixth Fleet from the Mediterranean.7° This 
signalled a sharp rise in the navigational intransigence of Soviet war- 
ships in the Mediterranean and the Sea of Japan,’ and the application 
in more distant waters of the policy of physical harassment which 
had long been the norm in “home” waters such as the Baltic and 
Black Seas. The following year saw a marked increase in the number 
of foreign visits made by Soviet naval units,2* and the use of naval 
forces for political purposes rose progressively. 
In the 4 years spanning 1968-71, the international image of the 
Soviet Navy changed radically. Before the 1967 Arab/Israeli war, it 
had been stretched to maintain a presence in the Mediterranean for 
9 months of the year. By mid-1969, having gained access to Egyptian 
port facilities, numbers deployed had risen to 7-11 submarines and 
9-13 surface combatants, with one or more SSM-armed units always 
on station and a substantial measure of shore-based air support. By 
the same date, the Soviet Navy had visited the Caribbean and had 
made significant contact with Guinea on the eastern side of the Atlan- 
tic. A form of continuous presence had been achieved in the Indian 
Ocean, there was an upsurge of naval visits, and to judge from the 
Western press, Soviet ships appeared to be everywhere. The impres- 
sion of vigorous growth was reinforced by the new classes which 
began to enter service during this period, by the twofold increase 
in nuclear-building capacity and by the appearance of the antisub- 
marine helicopter-carrying cruiser. And with it all came the increasing 
use of Soviet naval units for specifically political purposes in distant 
parts of the world. 
24 Admiral Kasatanov, “Izvestia,” 8 January 1966. 
*5 See the fourth Part of the First ‘“‘Resolution on the World Situation,’’ of the 23rd Congress of the 
CPSU. See also Gorshkov’s report on the Congress, which refers to being ready to “protect the 
achievements of socialism and inflict a crushing rebuff to any imperialist aggression”; ‘“‘Morskoj sbor- 
nik,”” May 1966, p. 10. ‘ 
26 At a conference of European Communist Parties, 23-26 April at Karlovy Vary, Czechoslovakia. 
27 This led to collisions in the Sea of Japan within 3 weeks, and in the Mediterranean within 3 
months. 
*4 See “Foreign Port Visits by Soviet Naval Units” in “Soviet Naval Policy” pp. 387-418. 
