oF 
The Soviet Navy had come a long way in 10 years. Nevertheless, 
despite the steady improvement in the quality of Soviet ships, one 
is struck by the niggardliness of the economic response to the reap- 
praisal of the maritime threat in 1961-64. In order to meet a serious 
threat to the Soviet Union, the navy had been required to shift to 
forward deployment and to develop a whole range of new operational 
concepts. There was, however, no reallocation of shipyard facilities 
to meet these new requirements, and as far as one can judge, the 
navy’s share of the defense budget remained constant. 
THE CONTEXT OF THE GORSHKOV SERIES: 1970-75 
The first article of the Gorshkov series was cleared for typesetting 
in December 1971, 8 months after the close of the 24th Party Con- 
gress, which approved the ninth 5 Year Plan. A review of the period 
1970-75 should therefore give us some idea of the situation facing 
the Soviet Navy at the time the articles were being prepared, and 
of the general trend of the short-range decisions which were ratified 
by the Congress. It will not, however, reveal the longer-term decisions 
(or arguments) concerning the details of the navy’s future role and 
the allocation of resources to naval development, although these are 
probably more significant in terms of the Gorshkov series. 
THE NAVY’S POLITICAL STANDING 
A surge of promotions to Fleet Admiral between 1970 
and 19737 suggested that the relative standing of the navy might 
be on the upswing. However, when viewed within the context of 
the armed forces as a whole,®° it seems that this partly reflected 
a process of catching up,*! and also reflected the general rationaliza- 
tion of the higher command structure which took place after 1967. 
It appears to have been conceded that the Northern and Pacific Fleets 
were of comparable standing to the key army commands and military 
districts, but the navy’s share of 4-5 star appointments is not out 
of line with the total number of naval personnel. 
Other evidence suggests that there has been no significant improve- 
ment in the navy’s political standing, and that army domination of 
defense policy has if anything increased. The navy continues to come 
last in all listings of the five branches of service. More significant 
were the 1971 changes in the military representation.on the Central 
Committee.”” The Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF), the navy and the 
air force remained the same, while the Main Political Administration 
(MPA) gained one candidate member, and Air Defense (PVO) gained 
two. Ground forces representation increased by six full members, and 
2"Sergeev (Chief of Naval Staff)—April 1970; Lobov (Commander-in-Chief Northern Fleet)—July 
1970; Borzov (Commander of Naval Aviation)—Marshal in early 1972. Lobov relieved Chabanenko 
as Assistant Chief of the General Staff in January 1972. Egorov (Commander-in-Chief Northern 
Fleet) and Smirnov (Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet) were promoted in late 1973. Smirnov re- 
lieved Kasatanov as Gorshkov’s deputy in the Fall of 1974. 
*°See John Erickson, “Soviet Military Power”, Royal United Services Institute (London 1971) pp. 
13-40, and an updated version in “Strategic Review”, Spring 1973, Supplement pp. 7-38. 
*!Gorshkov was only 45 when made an Admiral (3-star) in 1955 on taking over as Commander-in- 
Chief, and had to wait until 1962 to make Fleet Admiral (equivalent to Army General). He was 
promoted to Admiral of the Fleet of. the Soviet Union in October 1967 (one of 4 promotions of in- 
cumbents in the armed forces to more senior rank), and Kasatanov (his deputy and contemporary in 
age), was probably made Fleet Admiral at about this same period. This measured progress would 
have blocked promotion above Admiral for about a decade. 
“See John McDonnell, “‘The Soviet Defence Industry as a Pressure Group” in ‘“‘Soviet Naval Pol- 
icy”, p. 104, figure 6.3, amended by subsequent analysis. 
