94 
war with the West. Such questions have been the subject of debate 
within the Soviet Union since at least the early 1960’s, since when 
there had been major Soviet developments. These include the build- 
up in missile inventories, the achievement of nuclear parity and the 
shift toward detente, and the increased readiness to accept the 
Western concept of deterrence based on mutual assured destruction. 
It is therefore quite possible that in 1971 the navy’s war-fighting 
role was in danger of being de-emphasized, and this may indeed 
have happened.*? Not because the future contingency of war with 
the West had been ruled out, but because the significance of maritime 
operations in the post-exchange phase of a nuclear was was seen 
to be low, and because the possibility of a Western-initiated conven- 
tional war was thought to be minimal. 
THE WARTIME/PEACETIME ROLE 
With the entry into service of the Delta SSBN and the codification 
of the submarine’s strategic role in the SALT accords, the naval 
contribution to deterrence and nuclear strike was assured. However, 
it is possible that in 1971-72 the question was being debated of 
whether the SSBN force should become an organic component of 
the Strategic Rocket Forces.*° This would introduce major problems 
of control and coordination for the Fleet Commanders and the Naval 
High Command. There may also have been suggestions that with 
the introduction of the Delta SSBN, and its ability to launch strategic 
strikes from the protection of home waters, the requirements for other 
naval forces to operate in direct support of SSBN was thereby 
reduced.*! 
The other component of the wartime/peacetime role, the task of 
countering Western seabased strategic delivery systems, was also 
receiving due priority in 1971-72, as is shown by the pattern of 
naval deployments, by operational procedures in times of crisis, and 
by Soviet pronouncements on this score.*? However, with the emphasis 
on a multiple arms solution to this problem, it is possible that Gorsh- 
kov was concerned that in the years ahead the navy would lose 
control over these operations, particularly if radical new systems and 
platforms were to be introduced by the end of the decade. Nor is 
it clear whether developments between 1967-72 were in fact one 
stage of a progressive process, or merely an interim solution. The 
low surface building rates, the continued lack of afloat support and 
the dependence on politically insecure foreign bases, combine to sug- 
gest that they may only represent a short-term expedient. Meanwhile, 
a very different long-term solution may now be under development, 
which could be less favorable to the navy’s institutional interests. 
“This is suggested by Gorshkov’s 1974 Navy Day article (Pravda, 28th July) in which he states 
that the mission of “combatting the enemy fleet” now has lower priority than operations against land 
targets and the defense of Russia against such attacks. | am indebted to James McConnell for this 
point. 
““That this has taken place might be inferred from a standard listing of the five branches, in which 
the SSBN force neither appears as a coequal of the SRF (as has generally been the case since about 
1968), nor is it referred to in the naval section which is listed last (as usual). See S. L. Sokolov, 
““Krasnaya zvezda,”’ Feb. 23, 1974. I have not followed up and researched this point systematically. 
*'See B. Dismukes, ‘“‘The Soviet Naval General Purpose Forces: Roles and Missions in Wartime,”’ 
in “Soviet Naval Policy”, pp. 576-582 for a discussion of this requirement. 
For example, A. A. Grechko, “The Fleet of Our Homeland,” Msb 71/7. See also Gorshkov on 
the need for continual readiness, the increased significance of “the battle for the first salvo,” and the 
reference to marking Western fleets. Msb. 73/2/22, 23; 131-133. 
