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PROSPECTS 
Clear-cut evidence is lacking, but there would seem to have been 
several valid operational reasons why modifications to the navy’s 
long-term war-related role may have been under discussion in 
1971-72. There was also the long-standing debate on the best means 
of conducting combat operations at sea,#* the emphasis on multiarms 
solutions, persistent army criticism of money spent by the navy, 
and the continuing discussion about the proper ratio between branches 
and arms of service.* 
THE NAVY’S PEACETIME ROLE 
The Soviet Navy began its shift to forward deployment more than 
10 years ago, and we therefore have a growing body of fairly concrete 
evidence concerning its peacetime role. Soviet pronouncements refer 
to this role in general terms as ‘defending (or securing) state in- 
terests,” a nebulous formulation, whose scope has yet to be systemati- 
cally researched.** They also talk of the navy’s “international duty,” 
of “‘increasing Soviet prestige and influence” and of ‘“‘rebuffing imperi- 
alist aggression.”’ While not losing sight of the all-encompassing scope 
of ‘‘securing state interests’’, it is useful to discuss Soviet naval activity 
in terms of four major categories: establishing a strategic infrastruc- 
ture; countering imperialist aggression; increasing prestige and in- 
fluence; and protecting Soviet lives and property overseas. 
ESTABLISHING A STRATEGIC INFRASTRUCTURE 
The first category covers the task of establishing the physical, politi- 
cal and operational infrastructure required to support the Soviet 
Navy’s war-related task of countering Western seabased strategic 
delivery systems. The task is not referred to openly and I have inferred 
its implicit existence from the pattern of naval operations and port 
visits over the last 10 years. I believe that this task provides the 
primary motive for a broad span of decisions ranging from promoting 
a coup in a client state, to acquiring base rights by barely concealed 
coercion. Because it concerns the security of the homeland, this task 
is likely to be backed by a high level of political commitment, and 
“3 Gorshkov has referred to arguments in the mid-fifties that naval roles could be taken over by 
shore-based missiles; ““The Development of Naval Science,” Msb. 67/2/19-20. See also H. Ullman’s 
Goenee of the debate in the early sixties, “The Counter-Polaris Task,”’ ““Soviet Naval Policy,” pp. 
—591. 
“*Herrick refers to signs that existing allocations to naval development were under attack: R. W. 
Herrick, ‘““The Gorshkov Papers Revisited” (unpublished study, Mar. 13, 1974). He draws attention 
to a book review in ‘‘Istoria SSSR’’, November—December 1970, in which A. G. Kavtaradze implicitly 
criticizes naval allocations made at the army’s expense. 
“8See A. A. Grechko, “On Guard for Peace and the Building of Communism,’’ Moscow 1971; 
JPRS 54602, p. 45. “‘It is essential in the future to seek out .. . the most effective ratios between 
the Branches of the Armed Forces and between the Arms of the Branches ... ”. 
48] suspect that there is some debate as to just what should be categorized as “‘state interests,” and 
how far the Soviet Union should be prepared to go in promoting and protecting them. Gorshkov 
recently claimed that in 1941 the Red Fleet had the capability “‘to defend state interests in con- 
tiguous naval theatres’ (Msb. 72/8/24/5). In 1962, he gave it as an (additional) naval task, which 
was the particular responsibility of the submarine force; the context suggested that the term was 
possibly being used as an euphemism for ‘“‘strategic strike,’ which could not properly fit within the 
meaning of ‘‘defending the homeland from attack from the sea.” (“‘Krasnaya zvezda”’ (K.Z.) Oct. 30, 
1962). By 1965 it had been linked with the merchant fleet (K.Z. July 13, 1965). For an extended 
discussion of this term see J. McConnell, ‘‘The Soviet Navy in the Indian Ocean’’, Center for Naval 
Analyses, Washington, Professional Paper No. 77, August 1971 (reprinted in “Soviet Naval Develop- 
ments,” pp. 392-400). : 
