97 
1974).°? There were also the large-scale “Okean’”’ naval exer- 
cise/demonstrations in 1970 and 1975. 
PROTECTING LIVES AND PROPERTY 
The one clear-cut example of the navy “protecting Soviet lives 
and property overseas” involved the deployment of three warships 
to Ghanian waters at the end of February 1969. This appears to 
have effected the release of two trawlers which had been held by 
Ghana for 4% months, despite other forms of Soviet diplomatic and 
economic pressure.”® 
OVERVIEW 
Any particiular operation may further the objectives of more than 
one of these four peacetime tasks. The Guinea Patrol ‘“‘deterred im- 
perialist aggression” and “increased Soviet prestige and influence” 
in Africa. But its continuation after the Portuguese threat evaporated 
in 1974, suggests that its major justification may have been to 
“establish the strategic infrastructure’ by securing access to base 
facilities in that area. Tasks may also be in conflict with each other, 
and there is probably a tendency for the military imperatives of the 
“strategic infrastructure” task to work against the more diplomatic 
requirements of “‘increasing prestige and influence.”’ 
Reviewing the last 10 years of Soviet naval operations, the greater 
part can be explained by the war-related tasks, by the need to establish 
the strategic infrastructure to support these tasks, and by low-pressure 
political exploitation of the naval presence in distant waters. However, 
between 1970-72 there was a marked increase in operational activity 
directly in support of the two peacetime tasks of “‘countering imperi- 
alist aggression” and “increasing Soviet prestige and influence,”’ in- 
cluding the deployment of forces specifically to these tasks. The up- 
ward trend appears to have levelled off in 1972-73. 
PROSPECTS 
This raises the question of whether the increase merely reflected 
a combination of opportunity and improved capability, or whether 
it stems from a policy decision reached in 1970 and ratified at the 
24th Party Congress. Was there a decision to place greater emphasis 
on the political use of a military presence in peacetime? And more 
important, did this include an increased readiness to use military force 
to “secure state interests” in distant areas? 
The evidence is still ambivalent. Official pronouncements have long 
referred to the Soviet Union’s support of progressive forces and so 
For an overview see R. Weinland, “Soviet Naval Operations: 10 Years of Change” in “Soviet 
Naval Policy”, pp. 382-383. For details see: Bangladesh—C. C. Petersen, “The Soviet Port Clearing 
Operation in Bangladesh”, ‘‘Soviet Naval Policy”, pp. 319-340; Iraq/Kuwait—A. Kelly, ““The Soviet 
Naval Presence during the Iraq/Kuwait Border Dispute,” “Soviet Naval Policy”, pp. 287-306; 
Suez—C. C. Petersen, “The Soviet Union and the Reopening of the Suez Canal” (forthcoming). All 
three studies have been published separately as Professional Papers by the Center for Naval Analyses, 
Washington. 
The trawlers were arrested in October, on suspicion of complicity in a plot to overthrow the Pre- 
sident. See R. Weinland, “The Changing Mission Structure of the Soviet Navy,” ‘Soviet Naval 
Developments”, pp. 301-302. A factor in the decision to use naval force in this “imperialist” 
manner, may have been the Soviet interest in acquiring base facilities in Guinea. See “The Evolution 
of Soviet Naval Policy, 1960-1974,” “‘Soviet Naval Policy,” pp. 528-529. 
