99 
tary training and advisers, together with the necessary arms, and it 
has also shown an increased willingness to commit its strategic logistic 
capability to support military operations which are actually in progress. 
‘Although the direct involvement of Soviet forces in combat cannot 
be ruled out, official statements stop short of implying such support, 
and there is thought to be considerable army reluctance to becoming 
embroiled in overseas adventures. In Soviet discussions of the subject, 
the emphasis is on the continuing change in the correlations of forces 
in Russia’s favor. It is this historical process which is meant to be 
thwarting traditional U.S. policies based on a “position of strength,” 
and which makes the mere presence of Soviet forces an effective 
deterrent to “imperialist aggression.’ Of course, the manner in which 
this policy evolves will depend greatly upon the results it achieves 
and the type of response it evokes from the West. 
THE NAVY’S SHARE OF NATIONAL RESOURCES 
It is still too early to be certain, but it would seem that the 24th 
Party Congress did not authorize any significant increase in the alloca- 
tion of resources to the navy. Nor however, does it seem to have 
cut its existing share. Writing in early 1971, Marshals Grechko and 
Zakharov both stated that time had proven that the right course 
had been chosen for the development of the navy.*? Although this 
refers to long-range policy rather than resources, it does imply that 
no major change was foreseen, which is also the tone of Grechko’s 
Navy Day article in July of the same year.® 
This assessment is supported by the absence of information suggest- 
ing an increase in nuclear submarine construction. On past experience, 
a new generation of submarines may be expected to begin delivery 
in 1977-78, and it seems likely that U.S. officials would have leaked 
evidence of a higher building rate by now. Future surface warship 
construction is less clear, since a new family of major units may 
not be due before 1980 and there is some spare yard capacity. How- 
ever, afloat support ships have short lead times, and there has been 
no increase in their rate of buildup. 
If we return then to review the situation facing the Soviet Navy 
in 1971, we see that the process of restructuring their distant-water 
surface force was well underway; it was, however, proceeding at a 
relatively modest pace, with no significant increase in delivery rates 
above the niggardly sixties. Three classes of new-construction large 
antisubmarine ships were being built; the 9,000-ton Kara at one a 
year; the 6,500-ton Kresta IJ at about two units every 3 years; and 
the destroyer-sized Krivak at a littlhe more than two a year. Two 
of the Moskva-class of antisubmarine (helicopter) cruiser had entered 
service, and the first of the Kuril-class (twice as large but probably 
having the same primary role) was due for delivery in late 1973, 
with at least one more to follow. There were three major conversion 
programs of older destroyer-sized units; one had completed (8 SAM 
Kotlin), a second was progressing slowly (8 Krupny/Kanin) and a 
third (4 Kildin) was shortly to get under way.© The more modern 
~ ®Quoted by Herrick. Zakharov in “‘Sovietskaya Rossiya,” Jan. 19, 1971, and Grechko in Pravda, 
Feb. 23, 1971. 
®° A. A. Grechko, ‘The Fleet of Our Homeland.” Msb. 71/7. 
Sina e ; 7 : 3 ‘ 
; It is probable that the major weapon systems used for these conversions derive from the cancella- 
tion and rearrangement of the surface programs originally planned for the sixties. 
69-315 O - 76 -- 8 
