100 
Kashins (20 units) were to have their ASW capability upgraded and 
two of the old Sverdlov-class cruisers were being converted to com- 
mand ships. The navy had just taken delivery of its first fast replenish- 
ment ship (a modified civilian tanker) and a smaller custom-built 
class was about to begin delivery. Looking ahead, by 1980 the Soviet 
Navy could expect to have 4-5 air-capable antisubmarine “cruisers,” 
about 35 large antisubmarine ships of 6,000-9,000 tons, and about 
65 destroyer-sized units, including the 20 conversions, whose hull 
and machinery would by then be 20-25 years old. In terms of the 
tasks being levied on the surface forces in 1971, the new-construction 
programs are likely to have seemed rather austere. 
The submarine picture was rosier. Ten nuclear units were entering 
service a year, four attack and six SSBN. The Delta, carrying long- 
range ballistic missiles which could be launched from the relative 
safety of home waters, would begin to enter service in 1973-74, 
as would improved versions of the two attack classes (Victor and 
Charlie). A family of third generation nuclear submarines would start 
delivery in 1977-78, and we can assume that they have been designed 
to meet the new requirements which were identified in 1961-65. 
A new class of conventional submarine had begun construction by 
1971, and a radical submarine-launched tactical ballistic missile was 
completing development. Looking ahead to 1980, the navy might ex- 
pect to have about 190 nuclear submarines (about 60 strategic-ballistic 
and 130 tactical-attack), and perhaps as many as 150 nonnuclear 
units less than 25 years old. 
In the aerospace field, two new types of long-range ASW aircraft 
were entering service, and the use of V/STOL aircraft from the anti- 
submarine cruiser was being evaluated. Satellite surveillance and com- 
munications system were operational, and the methods of using land- 
based missiles against naval targets had been developed.” 
Of course we can only guess at the full range of future prospects 
known to Gorshkov in 1971-72. It does, however, appear that research 
and development on possible means of countering the threat from 
Polaris received high priority throughout the 1960’s, and it seems 
likely that at least some of the results were expected to be ready 
for operational application during the latter half of the seventies. — 
Some analysts are convinced that the Soviet Union has adopted a 
highly innovative approach to the submarine problem and has had 
a fair measure of success. They therefore expect new sensor and 
weapon systems, and original types of platforms and _ propulsion 
systems, to begin entering operational service by the end of the 
decade.® 
®In discussing the role of the Strategic Rocket Forces, Grechko includes the task of destroying 
‘“‘enemy means of nuclear attack and troop and naval groupings in theatres of military operations on 
land and sea.” (‘A Socialist, Multinational Army,” Pravda, Dec. 17, 1972). Deployment patterns led 
me to believe that the 6th Fleet had been targeted by land-based missiles since the middle sixties. 
®§K_ J. Moore and N. Polmar highlight the Soviet emphasis on nonaccoustic methods of submarine 
detection, the use of satellites in this and related roles, and the concept of the extended ASW team 
which includes satellite, air, submarine, surface ships and shore-based missiles. They note discussions 
in Soviet journals of new methods of submarine propulsion. They also draw attention to the Soviet 
development of wing-in-ground (WIG) effect vehicles and their suitability as platforms for high speed 
sea-area search, using multiple sensor arrays including anomaly detectors. Oral presentation at the 
third annual seminar on Soviet Naval Developments in Halifax, September 1974; see also N. Polmar, 
“Soviet ASW,” “‘United States Naval Institute Proceedings” (forthcoming, May 1976). 
