101 
However, the more immediate question facing Gorshkov in 1971-72 
was whether present and future capabilities were adequate to meet 
the increasingly varied requirements which were being levied on the 
fleet. And on this score there must be considerable doubts. Although 
the development of the submarine force and naval aviation was receiv- 
ing due priority, the majority of nuclear submarines had task-specific 
configurations and the allocation of resources to the surface forces 
was relatively meager. The Soviet Navy was not a “balanced fleet” 
in the “general purpose” sense, and the imbalance was, if anything, 
tending to increase. Meanwhile, although the shift to forward deploy- 
ment had leveled off in 1971-72, it is likely that the distant water 
forces were suffering from operational overstretch. There was already 
some evidence of this in the irregular pattern of surface ship deploy- 
ments in the Mediterranean in 1968—69,® in the expedients used 
to reduce submarine transit time and the type of submarine deployed,” 
and in the low combat capability of the Indian Ocean detachment 
and the length of the individual deployments.® Nor is this surprising, 
when we consider the operational costs involved in a wholesale shift 
to forward deployment.® To these demands must be added the in- 
creased political exploitation of the Soviet naval presence, coupled 
with a policy of reacting to a wider range of U.S. naval initiatives 
than hitherto. It is my impression that by 1971-72 the Soviet Navy 
was suffering from the well-known problem of being asked to do 
too much with too few ships. 
It is true that the quality of ships on distant deployment was steadily 
(if slowly) improving, but their geographical dispersion meant that 
quantity was becoming increasingly important. On a 25-year replace- 
ment cycle, the building rates in 1971-72 would maintain the number 
of distant-water surface ships (1.e., destroyer-size and above) at their 
existing strength of about 110 units.®° But the adequacy of that number 
®*See R. Weinland, “Soviet Naval Operations: 10 Years of Change,”’ “‘Soviet Naval Policy,” pp. 
375-386. All areas peaked during 1971 except for the Indian Ocean, which saw a slight increase in 
steady-state deployment in 1972. 
®>See “The Soviet Mediterranean Squadron: January 1968—June 1969,” “Soviet Naval Develop- 
ments,” Table 27.1, pp. 384-385. This ts the only period for which such detailed cover is available, 
but I have the impression that the same pattern extended into 1970 at least. During this period the 
Squadron still depended heavily on ships built during the first half of the fifties and designed for 
Operations within range of shore-based air cover, on first-generation SSM systems, and on escort 
ships designed for working closer to shore. 
°° The Soviet Navy began to deploy their submarines “‘in convoy” on the surface in 1969, almost 
halving transit time to the Mediterranean. The general shortage of attack submarines is suggested by 
the use of Zulus, first generation (1945 design-philosophy) diesel submarines, in the Mediterranean. 
Similarly with the use of the Juliet SSG as an alternative for the Echo SSGN. 
*7See “The Pattern of Soviet Naval Deployments in the Indian Ocean: 1968-71,” “Soviet Naval 
Developments,” Table 30.1, pp. 428-431. In 1970-71, the steady-state deployment comprised a Kot- 
lin gun-destroyer, an Alligator LSV, a Foxtrot diesel submarine and a T-s58 submarine rescue ship. 
The Kotlin spent 6 months deployed, by the end of which the efficiency of its sensor systems would 
be seriously degraded. The size of the detachment and the combat capability of individual units have 
improved somewhat since 1971, but the problems of maintaining sophisticated equipment in hot and 
humid climates are considerable. 
68 See “The Economic Costs of Forward Deployment,” “‘Soviet Naval Development”, pp. 231-235. 
*| use “distant-water” to denote the warship’s capability and not its role. I have taken the 
destroyer-size unit as the lower limit because the Soviet Navy is no longer building a 1,000—2,000 
escort-size ship and there appears to be a growing distinction between the capabilities of “‘distant- 
water” classes and those which are designed to operate within range of shore-based support (see 
“Current Soviet Warship Construction and Naval Weapons Development,” “Soviet Naval Policy”, 
pp. 439-440). Only a proportion of the 110 distant-water units would be available for sustained 
deployment, the remainder being required for tasks in the fleets and for special deployments. In con- 
sidering the adequacy of this number of ships, it should be noted that during the first 10 years of for- 
ward deployment, the Soviet Navy had to make considerable use of the 1,000—2,000-ton escort 
classes, together with the smaller general-purpose ocean minesweepers which, although useful as 
pickets, submarine guard ships, etc., have a very limited combat capability. During 1968-69, these 
two types made up 35-40 percent of the combatants on station in the Mediterranean. Another “stand 
in” is the Alligator-class landing ship, which has been the main type used for the Guinea Patrol and 
which, with the ocean minesweeper, made up SO percent of the steady-state combatant deployment 
in the Indian Ocean during 1970-71 and continues to comprise about one-third. 
