102 
would depend on the tasks to be discharged and the likely strength 
of the opposing forces. In the latter context Gorshkov would be aware 
that during the previous 10 years the navies of the capitalist bloc” 
had taken delivery of 2 to 3 times as many ocean-going surface 
ships (over 1,000 tons) as had the Warsaw Pact, and that if allowance 
was made for size and combat effectiveness, the disparity was more 
like 3 to 4 times as many.” The capitalist bloc had even built some 
half dozen more nuclear submarines during the period. Only in diesel 
submarine deliveries did the Soviets have a substantial lead, since 
a large proportion of Western units were smaller than 700 tons. Of 
course, by 1971-72 Russia was building twice as many nuclear sub- 
marines a year as the United States, but 60 percent of these were 
task-specific strategic-ballistic units. Meanwhile, the West as a whole 
was continuing to allocate substantially more resources to distant- 
water surface warship construction than was the Soviet Union. Nor 
were the auguries very reassuring. Between 1965 and 1969, U.S. out- 
lays on non-Vietnam naval programs had increased by 36 percent 
(17 percent in real terms); and between 1969-72, U.S. Government 
commitments to naval expenditure increased by 13 percent, whereas 
the army and air force were but by 18 percent and 13 percent respec- 
tively, leaving the navy with the largest share of the defence budget.” 
Within NATO, concern over Soviet deployments had prompted an 
unprecedented degree of continuous operational cooperation between 
the different navies and an increased willingness to devote funds to 
naval procurement and the development of shipboard SSM systems. 
Given the limited capabilities of his forces in distant sea areas, 
Gorshkov may have had reservations about a more assertive naval 
policy in support of client states. An increased emphasis on the role 
of a Soviet military presence in countering imperialist aggression was 
likely to bring short-term benefits; but in the longer term, to be 
effective such a policy must be backed by a willingness to use force 
if necessary. And although there was reassuring evidence of a 
restrained American response in a wide range of maritime situations, 
including the Eilat sinking and the Pueblo confrontation, Gorshkov 
must have been well aware of the exposed nature of his distant deploy- 
ments, and how the various detachments would fare in a showdown 
with a U.S. carrier task force. 
THE WIDER POLITICAL CONTEXT 
Where did these primarily naval factors fit within the broader con- 
siderations of Soviet national policy in 1971-72? It is generally con- 
sidered that the dominant concern of the political leadership at this 
period was the state of the Soviet economy and the requirement 
to upgrade individual management, productivity and technology.” 
Qn the capitalist side | include the NATO navies (including France, but not Sweden or Spain), 
plus Australia, New Zealand and Japan in the Pacific, since Russia would expect to have to contend 
with these forces in the event of war. I arbitrarily cancel out Communist China against South Korea 
and Taiwan, although Russia may well take all three into account as potential enemies. 
7™1See “Comparative Warship Building Programmes,” ‘‘Soviet Naval Developments”, pp. 144-150; 
also “The Military Balance: 1975-76” (IISS London), p. 88. 
72See A. M. Kuzmak, ‘‘Where does the U.S. Navy go from here?”’, “Military Review”, February 
1972. Percentages exclude the Marine Corps element; the dates refer to the U-S. fiscal year. 
74This is the general consensus in the special issue of “Survey” on Soviet Foreign Policy (Spring 
1973). See particularly Aspaturian, Dallin and Zimmerman on this score. Also Marshall Shulman, 
“Towards a Western Philosophy of Coexistence,” “Foreign Affairs”, October 1973 (“Trends in 
Soviet Foreign Policy,” “Soviet Naval Policy’, pp. 3-16). 
