103 
Achievement of strategic parity and a belief that the “dynamic correla- 
tion of forces’’ was causing the United States to discard its policy 
of “negotiating from a position of strength” in favor of negotiating 
as an equal, allowed these domestic concerns to become primary 
determinants of Soviet foreign policy.“ The policies of détente, of 
seeking measures to check the strategic arms race, of increased 
cooperation to the capitalist world, and of a greater emphasis on 
consumer goods, were specifically endorsed by the 24th Party Con- 
gress, and with them the implicit need to increase the flow from 
abroad of trade, capital, and advanced technology and management 
techniques. This did not imply that Russia’s defense posture was to 
be weakened, since there has always been a consensus that a success- 
ful national policy is founded on a strong defense capability. However, 
the military’s share of resources would not increase,” and, since na- 
tional security was in part based on the relative balance of capabilities, 
attempts would continue to negotiate reductions of force levels and 
geographical limitations on use.”* If successful these would “release 
considerable resources for constructive purposes.’’”” In June 1971, 
Brezhnev floated the idea of mutual restrictions on extended naval 
deployments, with particular reference to the Indian Ocean and the 
Mediterranean.” 
The dangers of nuclear war had been reduced by the SALT negotia- 
tions and by the trend toward détente with the United States. The 
“security of the homeland” had also been increased by moves toward 
legitimizing the status quo in Europe. However, two unfavorable trends 
had emerged. The Soviet Union had long had what Shulman calls 
a “limited adversary” relationship with the United States and this 
would of course persist within the framework of “peaceful coex- 
istence,”’ despite détente. However, a similar and perhaps more viru- 
lent relationship now existed with China, reaching beyond rivalry for 
world influence, to disputes over border territories and attempts at 
physical containment. China tried to create problems for Russia in 
both Eastern and Western Europe, while the Soviet Union sought 
to extend its containment round China’s southern borders, continuing 
eastwards through Burma and Indo-China to the sea. The second 
unfavorable trend also involved China. With the enlargement of the 
EEC and the continued growth of Japan, it looked as if a multipolar 
world of five major power centers was emerging. It also seemed possi- 
ble that Russia might find itself the odd man out of this group. 
“See Shulman (op. cit.) on this score. | lean heavily on his judgments in this paragraph. 
See “The Military Balance: 1975-76” (IISS, London), p. 10, for current estimates of defense 
speneye: In the period 1971, defense expenditure fell as a percentage of GNP but rose in money 
The Soviet Union has continuously striven to establish buffer zones around her perimeter, com- 
prising areas which have restrictions on military force-levels or use of one kind or another. In the 
naval field this is reflected in attempts to have special regimes declared for the Baltic and Black Seas, 
limiting their-use by navies of nonlittoral states. Efforts to have the Mediterranean declared a non- 
nuclear zone go back to 1958, and linked with the Indian Ocean, were specifically put forward as a 
U.N. resolution in 1964 (U.N. Resolution) and again in 1968. 
“L. Brezhnev, quoted in “24th Congress of the CPSU”, Novosti Press, Moscow 1971, p. 34. The 
reference is to the effects of the SAL treaty, but it is part of a general discussion on the desirability 
of disarmament and of regularizing the situation in Europe. 
Speech by Brezhnev, reported by TASS, June 25, 1971. See B. Blechman, ‘Soviet Interests in 
Arms Control” in “Soviet Naval Developments,” pp. 520-534. Apparently U.S. representatives fol- 
lowed up this remark, but the Soviets did not proceed with it. However, the statement is repeated in 
the Kulish study (note 53 above). 
