104 
THE COMPETITION FOR WORLD INFLUENCE 
These trends reached back several years. But it is possible that 
the more complex nature of this increased competition for world 
influence, combined with fears of future isolation and/or encirclement, 
may have contributued to the greater emphasis on Soviet support 
for Third World countries, which appears to have been endorsed 
at the 24th Party Congress. Despite the string of major political set- 
backs (Algeria, Ghana, Guinea, Indonesia, Iraq, Mali), and despite 
growing concern over the heavy burden which foreign aid placed 
on the Soviet economy, aid to potentially friendly countries had risen 
during the second half of the sixties, and in 1971 the allocation 
was more than twice the previous annual average.”* This apparent 
paradox can perhaps be explained by the political necessity to compete 
for such influence, win or lose, and also by a readiness to blame 
the earlier setbacks on Khrushchev’s misconceived enthusiasm for a 
series of “revolutionary democrats’, each of whom was successively 
overthrown. 
In late 1970 it must have appeared that ‘historic trends’ and more 
pragmatic Soviet policies were working in Russia’s favor. On the 
capitalist side, the United States was trying to disentangle itself from 
Vietnam, the Nixon Doctrine quite clearly limited the extent of future 
U.S. involvement overseas, there appeared to be a weakening of Amer- 
ican political purpose and ‘“‘the general crisis of capitalism continued 
to deepen.’’*® On the socialist side, progressive forces were on the 
advance. Allende was President of Chile; revolutionary nationalist 
regimes had seized power in Sudan, Somalia, and Libya during 1969, 
and the first two had turned to Russia for support; the national libera- 
tion movements in Portugal’s African colonies were becoming more 
effective; and it was only a matter of time before communists took 
power throughout Indo-China. 
Direct Soviet military support was given to client regimes on three 
occasions in 1970. The first was the dispatch to Egypt in March—May 
of Russian-manned air defense systems to prevent deep penetration 
raids by Israeli aircraft. The second occurred in April, when a naval 
visit to Somalia coincided with an unsuccessful plot to overthrow 
the government. And the third was the warship patrol established 
off Guinea following the Portuguese-supported invasion attempt in 
late November.®! 
However, “‘historic trends’”’ did not forsake their normal oscillations, 
and within a few months the situation in the Middle East had begun 
to turn sour on the Russians. The United States stood firmly by 
Jordan in September 1970 and was not inhibited in the use of the 
Sixth Fleet. Qdappi of Libya turned out to be an unpredictable 
maverick. Ali Sabri, the pro-Russian Vice President of Egypt, was 
arrested by Sadat in April 1971, charged with conspiring to seize 
power. In July, a Communist-led coup in the Sudan succeeded just 
long enough for the Soviets to extend a hand of friendship to the 
usurper before Nimeiry’s forces crushed the rebellion; the rift was 
7See Morton Schwartz ‘“‘The USSR and Leftist Regimes,”’ Survey, Spring 1973, pp. 202-244. 
89 Brezhnev, op. cit., p. 20 
8'For the last two incidents see J. McConnell, ‘The Soviet Navy in the Indian Ocean,” Soviet 
Naval Developments, p. 398. 
