105 
widened by Soviet protests over the execution of well-known Sudanese 
Communists. And Soviet-Egyptian relations progressively deteriorated 
until on July 6, 1972 Sadat gave the Soviet Union 11 days’ notice 
to begin withdrawing those forces which had deployed to Egypt since 
1970.82, Meanwhile, in South America, Allende’s government was 
running into serious trouble and he was overthrown and killed in 
September 1972. 
THE DEPLOYMENT INTO EGYPT 
The decision to deploy Soviet-manned air defense systems to Egypt 
in the spring of 1970 provides an insight to the development of 
Soviet policy at this period. A large number of Soviet military advisers 
and technicians had been engaged in the rebuilding of Egypt’s armed 
forces after the defeat in 1967, Soviet naval units made use of Egyp- 
tian port facilities and maritime reconnaissance aircraft staged through 
Egyptian airfields. But the deployment in 1970 was of quite a different 
order, involving the provision of a complete air defense 
“environment”, including 18 SA-3 missile systems and some 80 
fighters, with the number of Russian troops building up to over 20,000 
men, and airfields and missile sites coming under virtual Soviet con- 
trol. 
Where the initiative for this deployment came from, is of course 
significant. Egyptian sources have always claimed that it was their 
idea, and in his recent book Heikal describes Nasser’s secret flight 
to Moscow in January 1970, and how, by threatening to resign in 
favor of a pro-American leader, Nasser pressured Brezhnev into send- 
ing Soviet air defense units to Egypt.8* However, Uri Ra’anan has 
disputed this version of events, arguing that that is not the way in 
which the Soviet Union does business with weak client states, and 
that the initiative came from the Soviet side.2° He suggests that by 
the summer of 1969, Soviet military leaders had concluded that the 
War of Attrition was going badly for Egypt, and that the Soviet 
Union should either publicly sever all military links with Egypt, or 
else move in to provide the country with comprehensive and effective 
air defense. He considers that opinion within the Politbureau was 
divided on the subject, but that by November 1969 the issue had 
been decided in favor of intervention and was in fact raised at a 
Warsaw Pact meeting.®* Thus, when Nasser flew to Moscow in January 
1970 (and Ra’anan argues that he was invited by Brezhnev), the 
decision had already been taken in principle. 
As it happens, there is nothing in Heikal’s narrative which con- 
tradicts Ra’anan’s argument.®” The two versions can be readily recon- 
ciled if we allow that the Soviet leadership considered it essential 
82For various accounts of these events see M. Schwartz (op. cit.), pp. 230-2; R. O. Freedman, 
sete Soviet Union and Sadat’s Egypt,” Soviet Naval Policy, pp. 213-218; M. Heikal (op. cit.), pp. 
180-5. 
83 Mohamed Heikal, ‘“‘Road to Ramadan” (New York: Quandrangle/N.Y. Times Book Co.), pp. 
83-90, 161-166. 
84 Heikal, op. cit., pp. 82-90. 
85U. Ra’anan, ‘Soviet Decision-Making in the Middle East, 1967-73, Orbis, Fall 1973, also in 
Soviet Naval Policy, pp. 191-9. 
86 Ra’anan suggests that it was hoped to involve Warsaw Pact (as opposed to purely Soviet) troops 
in this operation. This would match with the attempt in that same year to persuade Warsaw Pact 
forces to station troops on the Mongolian frontier with China. 
87 Heikal says that Nasser ‘‘decided”’ to go to Moscow, but is not specific as to where the initiative 
came from (p. 83). 
