106 
that Nasser should be the one to suggest this type of direct support, 
and that the request should be conceded with a show of great 
reluctance and in large part as a personal favor to Nasser. This would 
enable the Soviet Union to extract maximum concessions “in return.” 
But perhaps more important, it would spike accusations of “‘military 
interventionism”’ and bolster Soviet claims that their support was of 
a completely different nature to imperialist military involvement. This 
explanation has the advantage of resolving specific contradictions in 
Soviet behavior which were noted by Heikal,** and it provides a plausi- 
ble rationale for the rather improbable decisionmaking process which 
the Egyptians witnessed in Moscow.®® 
Similar considerations can explain certain aspects of Soviet behavior 
at the time they withdrew their air defense units in July 1972. Heikal 
notes that the Russians were not surprised at the eviction order,% 
and it is possible (as Ra’anan argues) that by May 1972, the Soviets 
had decided that the cost/benefit balance of their military presence 
in Egypt was increasingly negative and they were looking for an oppor- 
tunity to withdraw without appearing to be deserting their protege. 
This view gains support from the Soviet refusal to subscribe to a 
face-saving joint communique, which would have declared that the 
experts’ work was now done. The onus for withdrawal had to be 
placed firmly on Egyptian shoulders, and Brezhnev is quoted as saying 
to Sadat, ‘““You asked for experts. If you want them to leave, that 
is your decision and we will comply with it. But we .. . will not 
take the responsibility before history of suggesting that they are being 
withdrawn at our request.”°! As Heikal comments (although un- 
wittingly, and in a different context), “Brezhnev . . . was brilliant 
at public relations.’’ 
This whole affair may shed some light on a wider policy debate. 
Irrespective of where the initiative came from, it is generally agreed 
that the deployment represented a major departure from established 
policy and was taken after discussion by the full Politbureau, with 
extensive involvement by the military. We can also be fairly certain 
that the decision was a controversial one and that there would have 
been those who stressed the risks and costs of such a policy and 
were less persuaded by the potential benefits. It is therefore significant 
that within 2 years the Soviet Union was no longer prepared to pay 
the rising political and economic costs of maintaining the deployment, 
88 When the agreement was reached in Moscow, Brezhnev made a point of stressing the need for 
secrecy. Yet, the very first time Soviet aircraft took to the air against the Israelis, the pilots spoke 
openly in Russian. Similarly, the first missile systems were driven openly from the docks in broad 
daylight with Russians waving and shouting to the crowds from the trucks (Heikal, p. 90). This ex- 
planation also illuminates Brezhnev’s flattery of Heikal as a ““communicator” (p. 89). 
®9One of the least plausible aspects of Heikal’s description of the Moscow discussions in January 
1970 involves Brezhnev making a decision in principle within 10 minutes, and the calling of a special 
meeting of the Politbureau to consider and rule on Nasser’s request (Heikal, p. 80). In view of the 
political, military and economic implications of the proposal, it is highly unlikely that either Brezhnev 
or the Politbureau would be prepared to reach any decision without extensive preliminary staff work; 
nor did the decision have to be given that same day. One must therefore assume that the principles 
had been agreed on some time previously, and if in fact the Politbureau did meet that day, it was to 
collectively ratify what was obviously an extremely controversial decision. | am not suggesting that 
Heikal’s personal narrative is incorrect; merely that he was not fully aware of what was happening 
and how Egypt was being manipulated. 
*° Heikal, p. 188. 
1 Ibid, p. 176. 
* Ibid, p. 89. 
