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and the original decision was (in effect) reversed. This provides some 
indication of how closely balanced the arguments must have been 
and suggests an element of continuing controversy within the decision- 
making apparatus. 
Meanwhile, it is reasonable to assume that the Politbureau discus- 
sions which underlay the decision on the Egyptian deployment pro- 
vided the basis for the new policy of emphasizing the role of a Soviet 
military presence in distant parts of the globe, which was endorsed 
at the 24th Party Congress. We would therefore expect a reversal 
of the original decision on Egypt to have some corresponding effect 
on the worldwide policy. It seems likely that the period 1969-73 
saw a sustained debate on the role of a Soviet military presence 
in support of foreign policy objectives outside the Warsaw Pact area, 
and its cost-effectiveness compared with other instruments available 
to Russia. The latter would include the supply of arms and military 
training, the merchant and fishing fleets, the normal processes of 
trade and aid, and various forms of diplomatic influence and political 
penetration. 
THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TREATY 
The SALT process had been underway since November 1969 and 
in May 1971, Brezhnev and Nixon agreed to reach some conclusion 
within 12 months. I suspect that an important byproduct of these 
negotiations was to give an extended group within the Soviet leader- 
ship a clearer understanding of the U.S. policymaking process, and 
of U.S. intentions (past, present, and future) and likely behaviour 
in differing circumstances. There have always been certain inconsisten- 
cies between U.S. pronouncements on national security and USS. 
weapons procurement policies, leading to serious doubts in Moscow 
concerning American intentions and her readiness to risk nuclear war. 
During most of the Kennedy administration, the Soviet leadership 
was genuinely concerned that the United States was trying to acquire 
the capability for a disarming first strike, if only to be able to negotiate 
‘from a position of strength.” 
The protracted SALT negotiations are likely to have persuaded 
a growing number of the Soviet military-political hierarchy that the 
U.S. leadership had never thought seriously in terms of initiating 
nuclear war against Russia; and that whatever U.S. policy might be 
towards the use of military force to secure American interests around 
the world, its leaders remained seriously concerned about the dangers 
of nuclear escalation. In other words, there would have been a 
progressive, but fundamental shift in Soviet threat perceptions. 
This is likely to have had two main kinds of effect. On the one 
hand, there would have been those who would see this as grounds 
for lowering tension, for reduced expenditure on defense and for 
the reallocation of resources to the civilian economy. And on the 
other, there would be those who would see new opportunities for 
a more assertive policy in pursuit of the Soviet Union’s international 
goals, who would call for a greater readiness to risk direct confronta- 
tion with the United States in distant parts of the world, and rather 
than reduce defense spending, would seek at the very least to re- 
allocate resources so as to provide the means for supporting a more 
