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assertive global policy. In the middle would be those straddling the 
fence, seeking to have the best of both worlds. Meanwhile, there 
would remain the unconvinced, and these might well make up the 
great majority of the military establishment, who would doubt whether 
the threat had in fact changed, and would continue to press priority 
for the direct defense of the Soviet Union and to argue the dangers 
of direct confrontation and of entangling overseas adventures. 
THE INTERNAL DEBATE 
As Shulman points out, doubts about the tendencies underlying 
the SALT process were not limited to the military. The major source 
of opposition came from the orthodox wing of the party and from 
the State Security apparatus, who focused on the ideological dangers 
of peaceful coexistence and détente, and on the economic dangers 
of abandoning autarky as an objective. 
The debate was therefore wide ranging. It extended from the alloca- 
tion of resources within the economy, to the role of military force 
in pursuit of international goals; from the likelihood of nuclear war 
and its nature, to the effects of peaceful coexistence on internal sta- 
bility and ideological commitment; from the dangers of economic 
dependence on the West, to the roles and missions of the different 
armed services. 
It appears however that some kind of compromise may have been 
reached in the Spring of 1973. At the Central Committee plenum 
in April, three new members were brought in to the Politbureau: 
Gromyko, the Minister of Foreign Affairs; Marshal Grechko, the 
Minister of Defense; and Andropov, the head of the Committee for 
State Security or secret police. Among those dropped was Shelest, 
who is reputed to have been a hardliner and against détente. There 
is also some evidence that the professional military debate was choked 
off in the latter part of May (see Appendix B, note 7). 
THE OVERALL CONTEXT 
It would appear, therefore, that the Gorshkov series was written 
and published at a period when a wide ranging argument was in 
progress, covering matters of direct concern to the Soviet Navy in 
terms of current operational employment and future institutional 
health. It was also a period which saw a new emphasis on the role 
of a Soviet military presence in countering ‘imperialist aggression,” 
and involved the more assertive use of naval forces in distant waters. 
This policy may however have been modified in 1972-73. 
The Soviet military establishment continued to be dominated by 
the ground forces and the navy still remained last of the five branches 
of service. However, the navy’s main mission of countering the West’s 
sea-based strategic delivery systems was receiving full support, with 
other branches (particularly the SRF) playing an increasingly impor- 
tant role. The Soviet Armed Forces had developed the capability 
of dealing with the strike carrier in a general war, but a counter 
to Polaris was still being sought, with radical new systems under 
development whose effectivenss had yet to be demonstrated. 
Meanwhile, a new class of SSBN would shortly enter service, able 
to strike at North American from Soviet home waters. 
