109 
Within the navy, priority continued to be given to nuclear sub- 
marines, which were building at ten a year and constituted the main 
force of the fleet; naval aviation was second in importance. By com- 
parison, the construction of distant water surface combatants was 
low, and the existing imbalance between surface and submarine forces 
would persist in the years ahead. Although the new surface ships 
had an improved general purpose capability, the navy as a whole 
was tailored for nuclear-missile war, with a large proportion of task- 
specific units. 
The new emphasis on the role of a military presence as an instru- 
ment of foreign policy, placed extra demands on Soviet naval forces. 
Especially in time of crisis, these were already fully extended in 
discharging their primary mission, and it seems likely that parts of 
the navy were suffering from operational overstretch, particularly the 
distant water surface forces. 
The navy’s shift to forward deployment had not been matched by 
an increased allocation of resources to naval construction and relied 
on the availability of shore facilities in the forward operating areas. 
Although the strategic threat from the Eastern Mediterranean was 
a matter of national concern, the Soviet Navy had been unable to 
sustain a year-round presence until it gained access to Egyptian ports 
after the 1967 war. The deployment of Soviet air defense units in 
1970 helped to ensure the security of these base facilities and con- 
solidated the use of Egyptian airfields by Soviet naval aircraft. The 
operational effectiveness of the Soviet Mediterranean squadron de- 
pended heavily on the continuing availability of Egyptian airfields 
and port facilities. Under these circumstances the navy would have 
viewed with considerable concern the gathering conclusion of the 
leadership, that the costs of a Soviet military presence in Egypt out- 
weighed the benefits. Besides losing access to the all-important air- 
fields, the Soviet Navy could not count on the Egyptian ports still 
remaining available. 
Gorshkov had spent 6 years of persuasion and pressure gaining 
access to those facilities and he would have been loth to let them 
go without a fight. This may have been the precipitating cause of 
the series. The second article includes a chapter ‘““The Russians in 
the Mediterranean” which, despite its historical setting, speaks clearly 
and at length about the strategic importance and political legitimacy 
of the present-day Soviet naval presence in that sea. 
THE SUBSTANCE OF THE GORSHKOV SERIES 
Gorshkov’s articles appeared between February 1972 and February 
1973. In some respects, the series fits into the general category of 
publication put out shortly after the 24th Party Congress, which were 
intended to explain and publicize the policy decisions endorsed on 
that occasion; the booklet published under Marshal Grechko’s name 
is one such.9? However, the whole balance, tone and thrust of Gorsh- 
kov’s writing, together with certain concrete evidence, has convinced 
the majority of analysts that the primary purpose of the articles was 
to argue a case and to persuade. Detailed justification of this conclu- 
sion is deployed in Appendix B. 
®3 Also the book edited by Kulish. For details see notes 54 and 55 above. 
