110 
The case being argued is that Russia needs a powerful navy for 
use both in peace and war. From the details of the argument one 
can infer a fairly closely-balanced high-level policy debate, which ex- 
tends beyond the navy’s role to the wider issues of peace and war, 
and the nature and style of Soviet foreign policy. 
The substance of the Gorshkov series can be seen from the detailed 
table of contents at the end of this section (Table 1). The bulk of 
the material is a selective historical review of the role of navies 
since the 17th century, and of the development of the Russian and 
Soviet fleets over those years. Eighty percent of the series covers 
the period prior to 1945, and roughly two-thirds of the historical 
discussion focuses on the various wars of the period, of which World 
War II takes about half. In his introduction, Gorshkov explains that 
his purpose in expressing “‘a few thoughts about the role and place 
of navies in various historical eras,’ is to ‘““determine the trends and 
principles of the change in the role and position of navies in wars 
and also in their employment in peacetime as an instrument of state 
policy.”” He has argued earlier that ‘‘the capabilities for conducting 
combat operations on the oceanic expanses have increased immeas- 
urably,” and also that “the place and role of each of the branches 
in a country’s armed forces can change both in peace and in war.” 
He concludes his introduction by noting ‘‘how the ability of people 
to learn to appreciate the ocean and to use it for their own needs 
directly affects the growth of the political prestige of the country 
and its economic and military power.” (72/2/20-23: 1-3) 
The Gorshkov series are rich in information. Although the dominant 
tone of the articles is that of advocacy and justification, they contain 
a strong element of ‘‘educating the fleet,’ and Gorshkov also makes 
many points in a debate of which we are only partially aware. For 
the purpose of this paper I have therefore concentrated on drawing 
out what I see as being the major strands of his argument. As far 
as possible I have avoided detailed textual interpretation, referring 
instead to my earlier analysis, and to the work of Herrick and Wein- 
land, who reach the same general conclusions. Detailed argumenta- 
tion on the navy’s role is contained in Appendix C, where I address 
various points of disagreement raised by McConnell’s analysis. 
In drawing conclusions from the Gorshkov series, certain caveats 
are in order. In the first place, Western attention has mainly focused 
on the details of what Gorshkov said and we still lack a proper 
analysis of where the articles fit into the wider Soviet debate. There 
has been no systematic comparison of Gorshkov’s remarks with what 
was being said in this period by the political and military leadership, 
by the other branches of the armed services, and in the various 
official organs and institutional publications. Second, our new un- 
derstanding of the 1960-65 period should warn us how difficult it 
is, without benefit of extensive hindsight, to be certain of the central 
focus of these internal debates. And finally, Gorshkov covers a very 
*4My analysis was completed in May 1973, and an edited version was published in Admiral Gorsh- 
kov on ‘‘Navies in War and Peace.” Center for Naval Analyses, Washington, CRC 257, September 
1974, pp. 21-70; this also contained analyses by R. G. Weinland (pp. 1-20) and J. M. McConnell 
(pp. 71-116). I will refer to these versions in the notes to this part of the paper. Weinland’s analysis 
is also published as ‘‘Analysis of Admiral Gorshkov’s ‘Navies in War and Peace,’ "’ Soviet Naval Pol- 
icy, pp. 547-572. Herrick’s full analysis appears in a series of unpublished working papers. His analy- 
sis of the first six articles appeared as “The Gorshkov Interpretation of Russian Naval History,” 
Soviet Naval Development, pp. 306-321. 
