tit 
wide field and we must beware of statements being lifted out of 
context to serve as evidence in unrelated areas. Gorshkov offers a 
reasonably coherent argument, and there is no analytical justification 
for using his statements out of context. 
In my interpretation of Gorshkov’s statements, I start with the as- 
sumption that in general, he means what he says. Morskoj sbornik 
is read widely throughout the Soviet Navy and Gorshkov indicates 
that his remarks are also addressed to the command echelons of 
the other branches of the armed forces. It therefore seems reasonable 
to take what he says at face value and, if there is doubt, to favor 
the self-evident and commonsense over the obtruse interpretation. 
I look for more complex explanations when Gorshkov’s remarks ap- 
pear to be out of context, or contradict either his own argument 
or established facts. 
We should also be aware of certain points concerning the publica- 
tions of the series. Weinland has drawn attention to a range of anoma- 
lies, including the unprecedented censorship delays which were im- 
posed on the publication of Morskoj sbornik after the fifth article 
in the Gorshkov series. And the fact that the July (Navy Day) issue 
broke the series to carry an article by Gorshkov on the role of 
ship commanding officers. (See Appendix B.) It is also possible that 
the series as originally planned, consisted of the first 10 articles only. 
They comprise a coherent whole. There was a 1 month gap before 
the 11th and final article appeared. And it consisted of 2 unrelated 
chapters, which were not only very different from each other, but 
differed greatly from the previous 10 articles in terms of style, content 
and structure of argument.** 
AN ASSERTIVE FOREIGN POLICY BASED ON MILITARY POWER 
The fifth article in the series covers the development of the Soviet 
Navy from the Revolution until 1928 and includes a section entitled 
“The Leninist Principles of Military Science.” This is sandwiched 
between sections on the October Revolution and the Civil War, and 
in most respects it stands out as a massive non sequitur, the only 
justification for its location being historical chronology. (72/5/13-15: 
55-56) 
In this section, Gorshkov enunciates 10 principles which he draws 
from Lenin’s works; they cover subjects ranging from the supremacy 
of the party, to the factors underlying victory in war.% I believe 
that each of these principles has been carefully chosen to provide 
the necessary underpinning to different points of Gorshkov’s argument, 
and that some of them stand as injunctions (or implied criticisms) 
on their own. I consider that special weight should be given to them, 
and I will draw on some of them at later stages of this analysis. 
It also seems probable that some of the political arguments which 
are central to the wider debate, are addressed by Gorshkov in this 
section. 
*>The 10th article comprised the chapter ‘“‘Navies as an instrument of the aggressive policy of the 
Imperialist States in peacetime.’ As shown in Table I, there was an asterisk break towards the end of 
the article (the first in the series), followed by what could be read as a summing up of the argument 
of the whole series. The only other asterisk break appears at the end of the 1 Ith article, and is fol- 
lowed by a 520 word conclusion. These concluding paragraphs would, if anything, fit rather better at 
the end of the 10th article, and would still come within the average length. 
96See MccGwire (CNA) pp. 23-24. 
