112 
Taking the section as a whole, Gorshkov could be interpreted as 
quoting Lenin in support of an assertive foreign policy based on 
military power. He considers that détente as a political tactic un- 
dermines fighting morale. Defense requirements must be based on 
the enemy’s present and future capabilities, and must come before 
all other demands on the economy. The armed forces must be struc- 
tured to fight and win a nuclear war if necessary. The more active 
foreign policy should use surprise and local military superiority to 
exploit the adversary’s weaknesses and to seize and retain the initia- 
tive. Once the policy and plan of action have been decided there 
must be no faltering, or political backsliding from the ongoing struggle. 
A similar emphasis on the role of military power appears in the 
introduction to the series, where Gorshkov quotes Lenin’s dictum 
that ‘“‘politics is the reason, and war is the instrument, and not the 
other way around. Consequently it only remains to subordinate the 
military point of view to the political.” (72/2/20/5: 2/1/3) This is 
a standard quotation, which can be found for example in Sokolovskij’s 
“Military Strategy,” °7 but Gorshkov goes on to say that in the past, 
the outcome of foreign policy negotiations has depended on relative 
military power. He returns to stress this point in the course of his 
historical review. (72/4/13/10, 14/4, 15/7: 28/1/4, 2/3, 29/2/2) 
Meanwhile Gorshkov’s emphasis on Lenin may itself echo some 
aspect of the wider debate. In the third edition of “‘Military Strategy” 
a whole series of references to Lenin have been omitted, along with 
certain references to Frunze, another authority quoted by Gorshkov.% 
It would appear that these deletions had some special significance, 
since they do not affect the meaning of the original text. Equally, 
Gorshkov’s emphasis on these doctrinal authorities would suggest some 
kind of fundamental desagreement. 
We are therefore left with the impression of Gorshkov being in- 
volved in a wide-ranging debate which extends to cover the role 
. of military power as an instrument of foreign policy. 
THE IMPORTANCE OF NAVIES IN WAR AND PEACE 
The importance of navies is the dominant theme of the series, 
and as Herrick remarks, “it would require a fertile mind to turn up 
an argument that he has not already woven into the fabric 
at one or more points.” °° Gorshkov asserts that naval power 
has always been an attribute of great power status and that history 
‘shows that those states which do not have naval forces at their 
disposal have not been able to hold the status of a great power 
for very long.” (72/2/23/5: 3/2/4) The great majority of Gorshkov’s 
historical examples are shaped to show the importance of navies to 
the conduct and outcome of war over the centuries, the navy’s role 
in projecting military power into distant areas in peacetime, and the 
penalties which a lack of naval power has inflicted on Russia in 
the past. (See appendix C for a summary of examples). 
87V_D. Sokolovskij Voennaya Strategiya, Moscow 1968, p. 24. 
°*See Harriet Fast Scott Military Strategy (Third Edition: a translation analysis, and commentary 
and comparison with previous editions), Stanford Research Institute, January 1971, pp. 170-172, 
notes 1-4, 174 notes 8 and 11, 212 note 2, 309 notes 2-3, 415 note 8. The subhead “The Marxist- 
Leninist Concept of War in the Modern Era” (p. 213 note 5). A new paragraph was inserted in the 
1968 edition which began “Speaking of Soviet military doctrine, it must be said that its political 
aspect was formulated by V. I. Lenin."’; by omission, the implication is that Lenin did not formulate 
the military aspect. (p. 68) 
® Herrick, op. cit. p. 306 
