113 
Russia’s status as a maritime power and her need for a powerful 
navy is of course acknowledged by the official line. For example; 
in 1971 we have Marshal Grechko voicing the same complaints that 
Gorshkov advances in his first article, to the effect that Western 
propaganda has always tried to classify Russia as a continental power, 
and to deny her need for a fleet.1° In the same article Grechko 
recognizes that ‘“‘combat operations on the oceans and the seas are 
acquiring a new significance. Navies can have an enormous impact 
on the entire course of a future war,” and goes on to mention the 
radical qualitative changes which have taken place in the means of 
warfare at sea. And in “Military Force and International Relations,” 
Kulish refers to the fact that “the increased power and mobility of 
the Soviet Navy radically changed the military-strategic situation on 
the world’s ocean.” "°! 
However, Gorshkov’s advocacy of the navy’s role in war and peace 
goes well beyond these mainly factual assertions. Besides the sheer 
volume of argument which he assembles, and the tone of his conclu- 
sions, we have his emphasis on the increasing importance of the ocean 
as an arena of conflict. And there is also his claim in the introduction 
to the series that “‘the place and role of each of the branches of 
a country’s armed forces can alter in peacetime and in war, depending 
on technological changes, on the enemy being confronted, on the 
geographical conditions, etc.” (72/2/22/2: 3/1/2) Given the nature 
of his discussion of these determining factors, he can only be implying 
that the change should be in the navy’s favor. And in fact, in the 
conclusion to the whole series he asserts that ‘‘the absolute and rela- 
tive importance of naval warfare in the overall course of a war has 
indisputedly grown.” (73/2/24/8: 134/2/3). 
THE NAVY’S WARTIME ROLE 
Gorshkov makes very few references to the Soviet Navy’s wartime 
role and these concern nuclear-missile war. In his introduction he 
asserts that the particular attributes of naval forces have “catapulted 
navies into the front rank of the diverse modern methods of armed 
conflict.”” (72/2/20/2: 1/2) And in his final chapter he states that 
“the basic mission of great power navies in a worldwide nuclear 
war’’ comprises three tasks: 
l. ‘Participation in the attacks of the country’s strategic nuclear 
forces.” 
2. ““Blunting the enemy naval forces’ nuclear strikes from the ocean 
axes: 
3. “Participating in the operations conducted by ground forces in 
the continental theatres of military operations.” (73/2/21/3: 131/2/2) 
The first of these tasks involves the SSBN force. This is one of 
three specific (plus one possible) references to SSBN or a Soviet 
naval role of strategic strike. (See appendix C.) 
The wording of the second  task—literally ‘‘weakening” 
(oslablenie)—implies direct action against enemy naval strike forces 
100A. A. Grechko ‘‘The Fleet of Our Homeland,” Msb. July 1971. This is the Navy Day issue of 
Morskoj sbornik. 
ter'v. M. Kulish, op.cit. p. 317 (JPRS translation, p. 104). 
