114 
or against their weapons shortly after launch. The peacetime aspect 
of this task is also explicitly referred to by Gorshkov (see below). 
The scope of the third task is less clear and Gorshkov’s description 
can be read in two very different ways. If we see the final chapter 
as drawing together the arguments he deploys in the earlier articles, 
then Gorshkov’s words could be read as encompassing the full range 
of naval operations in World Wars I and II. To some extent they 
echo Gorshkov’s conclusions concerning naval operations in World 
War II, the latter having a ‘“‘clearly continental nature. The activities 
of navies were goal-oriented toward cooperating with the ground 
fronts, and towards supporting their needs.” (72/11/33/7: 108/2/3) 
This judgment comes in a chapter which is primarily devoted to the 
analysis of Western naval operations. 
However, if we apply a more restrictive interpretation to Gorshkov’s 
wording, it implies that apart from the first two tasks, naval operations 
will be limited to the direct support of military operations on land, 
which is of course the Russian Navy’s traditional role. 
In any case, the fact that Gorshkov devoted 20 percent of the 
whole series to discussing and analysing the worldwide non-Russian 
naval operations in World Wars I and II is significant. In his chapter 
‘“‘The Basic tasks carried out by navies in the course of the Second 
World War” (72/11: 99-109), two thirds of the discussion is devoted 
to the battle of sea communications, the other two major subcategories 
being amphibious operations (Western style) and the destruction of 
enemy striking forces. 
Gorshkov concludes that although the war was won in the continen- 
tal theatres (primarily on the Russian front), Western naval operations 
made an important contribution to the outcome. I get the strong 
impression that the significance of this naval contribution to the war 
effort was one of the major points that Gorshkov sought to establish. 
Taking the series as a whole, I infer that Gorshkov is arguing that 
protracted war at sea is a possibility which must be allowed for. 
He envisages attacking merchant convoys and troop reinforcements, 
and perhaps the occupation of the Norwegian coast at the outbreak 
of war.’ His remark that “naval forces can better withstand the 
effects of nuclear weapons than ground force” (72/2/20/2: 1/2/1) 
suggests that he is talking of the postnuclear exchange period, but 
it is not clear whether he also thinks that limited war at sea is 
possible, without eventual escalation. His reference to Russia’s un- 
limited resources (73/2/19/6: 129/2/4) and his extended discussion 
of the effects of commerce war have overtones of a long drawn- 
out war fought mainly at sea, with no nuclear exchange. 
It seems unlikely that the restrictive interpretation of the third task 
is correct, since it runs counter to the whole trend of the argument 
in the previous articles. And Gorshkov does perhaps suggest a broader 
compass when he adds that “in these circumstances, navies will per- 
form a large number of complex and major missions.” 
To sum up Gorshkov’s treatment of the navys wartime role, we 
can say that he refers to the tasks of delivering strategic strikes and 
blunting the enemy’s seabased strikes, but gives them no special 
prominence. His remarks on this score are factual and he makes 
no attempt to justify these two tasks. What he does try to justify 
"See MccGwire (CNA) pp. 49-51. 
