115 
by historical analogy (and at considerable length), is the possibility 
of protracted war at sea, certainly in the period following a nuclear 
exchange and perhaps also in circumstances of limited war. This is 
one of the major strands of his overall argument. 
THE WARTIME/PEACETIME ROLE 
A detailed analysis of Gorshkov’s references to the two elements 
of this role can be found in Appendix C, and he does not give 
the impression that he is arguing about either of them. Gorshkov 
makes a single reference to the SSBN’s growing contribution to 
nuclear deterrence, where he mentions that their greater survivability 
means that they are more effective in this role than land-based 
systems. The tone is factual and he would not seem to be justifying 
the navy’s share of this task, or advocating a larger one. 
The other element of this role, the task of countering Western 
sea-based strategic delivery systems, is referred to as the navy’s main 
task. The navy is said to be successfully fulfilling this task—‘“‘the 
defense of the country from attacks by aggressors from the ocean 
axes’’—along with other branches of the armed forces, special empha- 
sis being given to the strategic rocket forces. 
THE NAVY’S PEACETIME ROLE 
Both in the historical chapters and in the contemporary ones, Gorsh- 
kov places considerable emphasis on the utility of navies as instru- 
ments of national policies in peacetime. Referring to contemporary 
circumstances, he stresses the role of naval visits as a means of 
“strengthening the international. influence of the Soviet Union.” 
(72/12/21/9: 119/2/5) Referring to the task of countering imperialist 
aggression in distant sea areas, he describes the Soviet Navy as “a 
powerful means of defense on the oceanic axes, a formidable force 
for the deterrence of aggression, which is constantly ready to deliver 
retributory blows and disrupt the imperialists plans.” (72/12/21/2: 
119/1/3 and appendix C) 
In many respects, Gorshkov’s discussion of the peacetime role of 
navies fits in with the increased emphasis on the role of a Soviet 
military presence, which appears to have been endorsed at the 24th 
Party Congress. This is discussed by Kulish in his book,!* who gives 
due attention to the navy’s role in this regard and specifically mentions 
the Soviet squadron in the Mediterranean. There is however a distinct 
difference in balance between the two treatments. While not under- 
playing the naval contribution, Kulish discusses the question of military 
presence in general terms, referring to the increased importance being 
attached to strategic mobility, and possible future requirements for 
““mobile and well-trained and well-equipped armed forces.” In con- 
trast, Gorshkov places all his emphasis on the navy’s unique qualifica- 
tions for this particular role, presenting all the arguments in favor 
of navies which we know so well in the West. He is also at pains 
to point out the inherent limitations of other forms of military force 
in this role. (72/12/16/3—4: 115/1/3-4) 
Kulish emphasises the reactive nature of a Soviet military presence 
and claims that the Soviet Union is prepared to withdraw such forces 
'3Kulish op. cit. pp. 133-139 (JPRS translation pp. 101-105). 
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