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if the imperialist powers would do likewise; he quotes in support 
Brezhnev’s 1971 proposals for mutual restrictions on naval operations. 
Although Gorshkov does stress that the goals underlying the Soviet 
Navy’s peacetime role are fundamentally different to those of the 
Western imperialist navies, there is no suggestion that he favors mutual 
withdrawals. Taking the series as a whole, Gorshkov’s emphasis is 
on the positive benefits which accrue from the use of navies in 
peacetime to protect and promote state interests. Gorshkov’s style 
is also more assertive than Kulish’s. The reference to deterring imperi- 
alist aggression quoted at the beginning of this section implies active 
interposition (at the very least), and other comments by Gorshkov 
might be read as implying direct intervention in local wars (73/2/21/4, 
9-10: 131/1/4, 2/2-3), although he never quite says so. 
And finally, if we compare the Gorshkov series with Grechko’s 
“On Guard for Peace and the Building of Communism,” it would 
appear that their interests lie at opposite poles. Grechko concentrates 
the majority of his discussion on the requirements for the defense 
of the Soviet Union and on relations with the Warsaw Pact countries. 
His references to a wider international role are marginal and he does 
not discuss the role of a military presence in peacetime. 
We can sum up Gorshkov’s treatment of the peacetime role by 
saying that while arguing within the approved framework of and in- 
creased emphasis on a Soviet military presence, he goes well beyond 
other statements in his advocacy of this role in general and of the 
navy’s unique qualifications to fulfill it, and in his emphasis on the 
limitations suffered by other branches of the armed forces. The asser- 
tive use of navies in peacetime for the protection and promotion 
of state interests is one of the main strands of Gorshkov’s argument. 
THE SIZE AND SHAPE OF THE SOVIET NAVY 
In his chapter analyzing the main types of naval operation in World 
War II, Gorshkov points out that the task-specific fleets were severely 
handicapped in comparison to those which had a broad and more 
balanced capability, capable of carrying out large-scale and strategic- 
type missions. As unfavorable examples he cites the German Navy, 
which was virtually limited to attacking sea communications, and the 
Japanese Navy, which had almost no ASW capability. By contrast 
the British and American Navies were able to carry out “‘broad 
strategic missions.” (72/11/32/5: 105/2/7) 
Gorshkov returns to this theme in his final chapter, in a passage 
discussing the capabilities of the Soviet Navy. He mentions that 
‘through the will of the Central Committee of the CPSU,” the Soviet 
Union had embarked on the construction of an oceangoing navy, 
based on various types of nuclear submarine. Then, starting a new 
paragraph and using the present tense, he says ““However, a modern 
navy, whose mission is to conduct combat operations against a strong 
enemy cannot only be an underseas navy.’ He supports this assertion 
by referring to the heavy penalty paid by Germany in both World 
Wars for failing to provide aircraft and surface ship support to sub- 
marine operations (73/2/20/7-8: 130/2/4—-S). Gorshkov had stressed 
this same point in his earlier analysis of the unrestricted submarine 
campaign in World War I (72/5/17/6: 45/1/3) and the battle for 
sea communications in World War II. (72/11/28/6: 103/1/1) 
