Wi 
He goes on in the next paragraph to say ‘Therefore, we, while 
giving priority to the development of the submarine force, consider 
that we have a need not only for submarines, but also for various 
types of surface ship. The latter, besides providing combat stability 
to the submarines, are intended to discharge a wide range of tasks, 
both in peacetime and in war.” (73/2/21/1: 131/1/1) 
These two paragraphs read like advocacy, or at the very least, 
justification. It is noteworthy that Gorshkov does not link “‘The will 
of the Central Committee” with the requirement for surface ships, 
but only with the past decision to build an oceangoing fleet based 
on submarines. The impression of advocacy is reinforced by the rest 
of the second paragraph, when Gorshkov talks of the need for a 
diverse range of surface ships and points out that “attempts which 
have been made in a number of countries to build universal 
(universal’nyj) ships to carry out all (or many) tasks, have not been 
successful’”’. 
If we analyze the structure of the Soviet Navy, we see that by 
comparison with western fleets, it has a relatively small range of 
surface ships. In contrast to the proliferation of specialized types which 
have appeared in western navies since the war, the number of different 
types of Soviet distant-water unit has remained roughly constant since 
before the war, except that since 1970 they have ceased building 
the escort-sized unit. Their new surface units are jampacked with 
weapon and sensor systems, the penalty for which is a limited capa- 
bility for sustained combat operations.'** Meanwhile, nuclear sub- 
marines are building at 10 a year, while distant-water surface units 
are being delivered at half that rate, or less. When U.S. admirals 
comment that the Soviet Navy has a “sea denial mission,” they are 
in fact saying that it does not have the capability for “broad strategic 
missions’, which Gorshkov advocates. It would appear that when 
Gorshkov says “We . . . consider that we have a need .. . for vari- 
ous types of surface ship”’ he is expressing opinion and not policy. 
He clearly accepts that advances in weapon, sensor and propulsion 
systems “‘are objectively fostering the advance of submarines an avia- 
tion into the forefront of naval forces” (73/2/20/3: 130/1/8), but 
considers that the essential contribution of surface ships is not being 
given sufficient attention. When discussing the question of “balanced 
forces” in late 1971/early 1972 with Western naval officers in 
Moscow, Gorshkov commented that while it was easy to defend the 
requirement for submarines, it was much harder to justify the need 
for surface ships. 
Later in the same chapter, Gorshkov reviews the characteristics 
which naval forces require for operations in the “nuclear era’’ when 
opposing forces remain in company with each other in peacetime, 
with the need for continuous, instant readiness to fire “‘the first salvo.” 
(73/2/22/2: 131/3/5) He stresses three main requirements: (1) long 
range at high speed for surface ships; (2) large radius of action for 
aircraft; and (3) nuclear propulsion for submarines. (73/2/22/5: 
132/2/2) He brings out various other requirements generated by the 
need for extended deployments: (1) surface combatant design must 
provide for good seakeeping and long endurance; (2) improved ser- 
1047. W. Kehoe ‘“‘Warship Design: Ours and Theirs,’’ U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, August 
1975, p. 64. 
