118 
vice-life and reliability of machinery (this point is stressed); (3) im- 
proved habitability,; and (4) effective afloat support. (73/2/22/6-9: 
132-133) He also makes the point that the greater the endurance 
built into ships, the smaller the numbers required. 
These are the minimum requirements for sustained forward deploy- 
ment. It is a list of what Gorshkov needs rather than what he’s 
got. Nor is it clear whether all these requirements have been accepted 
as inputs to future procurement. I get the strong impression that 
Gorshkov is not satisfied with the existing and projected structure 
of the Soviet Navy. While I am unwilling to accept Herrick’s conclu- 
sion that Gorshkov is advocating the construction of a navy which 
could challenge the West for naval supremacy,’ the emphasis 
throughout Gorshkov’s argument is on the importance of adequate 
naval strength, of contributions by all arms of service, and of properly 
balanced forces. As a fleet with worldwide pretensions, the Soviet 
Navy is not a balanced force, either in the generally understood mean- 
ing of the term, or the sense in which Gorshkov discusses the require- 
ment in these articles.!°° As I read Gorshkov’s argument, his main 
concern is for more surface ships, with a much improved capability 
for sustained deployment, and he needs additional types of ship. He 
needs effective mobile afloat support. And he wants to develop a 
fleet which has a better balance and the capability to discharge a 
wider range of tasks.1°7 
So much for what Gorshkov actually says. But what he left out 
may also be important. His previous major statement on naval matters 
was an article in February 1967, which discussed the postwar develop- 
ment of naval art. In that he pointed to the Soviet decision to concen- 
trate on submarine-launched missiles as the main striking arm of the 
fleet; and he reaffirmed the correctness of the decision in the light 
of subsequent experience, which had confirmed the vulnerability of 
carriers. (67/2/19/2-3) In the present series Gorshkov makes no 
reference to the carriers’ vulnerability. 
This may not be significant. In the present series he does not discuss 
detailed tasks or contemporary comparative capabilities, nor does he 
discuss the development of naval art in the postwar period, so perhaps 
no comment was to be expected. Gorshkov does however refer to 
the fact that Soviet ships are ‘‘at sea for long periods close to imperi- 
alist fleets, and have the opportunities to really evaluate their strong 
and weak points .. . ’’ (73/2/23/2: 113/1/6) and here he is talking 
mainly of carrier forces. 
What, if anything, does Gorshkov have to say about carriers? In 
his analysis of naval operations in World War II he points out that 
5R.W. Herrick ““The Gorshkov Papers Revisted’’. Unpublished paper March 1974, p. 2 and Ap- 
pendix A. Herrick notes that the Gorshkov series include almost every conceivable justification for 
building a better balanced and a larger navy. He examines 22 historical examples used by Gorshkov 
in his analysis, and concludes that in 15 of them the need for more ships is clearly implied. The ex- 
amples are culled from Chapters X-XIIlI, i.e. only four articles, which are limited to the period since 
1939. More examples could be found from the earlier periods. 
'6The Soviets often claim that they already have a balanced fleet, but this relies on a tautological 
definition. As explained by Gorshkov in 1967, a well-balanced fleet is one that by reason of its com- 
position and armament is capable of discharging the tasks assigned to it, whether in nuclear-missile 
war, Or non-nuclear-missile war, or in protection of state interests in time of peace. (Msb. 
67/2/20/footnote). There is no indication of what the assigned tasks are. It is significant that Gorsh- 
kov focused his criticism of the German and Japanese Navies on the restrictive nature of their mis- 
sion, rather than on the composition of their fleets. 
'7See MccGwire (CNA), p. 45. 
