120 
(72/8/21/3: 71/1/6) In drawing conclusions from World War II, Gorsh- 
kov stresses the penalties of a narrowly defined mission and points 
out how Germany’s dependence on submarines forced her to adopt 
a defensive maritime strategy, and at the same time he brings out 
the advantages of a balanced fleet. (72/11/32/5: 105/2/7) Other less 
explicit references reinforce the impression that Gorshkov is trying 
to establish that there is a correct, offensively oriented strategy, which 
relies on a properly balanced fleet. And a misguided, defensively 
oriented strategy which places primary reliance on submarines. 
In the course of his discussion of these two opposing schools of 
thought, Gorshkov refers to a theory of ‘““command of the sea,” which 
was held by the offensive school (which he supported), but -stresses 
that the theory was somewhat different to the one held in the West. 
The theory, propounded by Belli, was one of “‘limited command,” 
which relied on achieving local superiority in the main sector by 
pinning down enemy forces in secondary sectors in one way or 
another.'°® He concludes, rather ambiguously ‘‘It was precisely this 
interpretation of command of the sea which underlay the employment 
of naval forces in combat operations at sea.”’ (72/8/21/3: 71/1/1) 
This passage, referring both to the ‘command of the sea” theory 
and to the existence of offensive and defensive schools is interesting 
for two reasons. First, Gorshkov covered this same period in his 
1967 article and made no reference to an offensive school of thought, 
to a “command of the sea theory” or to Belli’s definition of limited 
command. Discussion concentrates on the defensive viewpoint 
stemming from the ‘“‘small war’’ theories. And second, in 1967 he 
clearly states that the defensive view held sway through into the 
1950’s, but in 1972 he implies obliquely that the offensive school 
gained ascendency by the end of the 1930’s. These contradictions 
assume added significance when we link them with Gorshkov’s 1967 
reference to the vulnerability of aircraft carriers and the correctness 
of the Soviet decision to rely on missile-armed air and submarine 
forces; (67/2/19/2-3) and with the absence of any such remarks in 
the present series. The carriers fit well into the ‘‘correct’’ offensively- 
oriented strategy, which relies on a properly balanced fleet; and the 
air and submarine forces fit equally well into the ‘“‘misguided”’ defen- 
sively-oriented strategy, which places priority on submarines. 
There is a further point to be made about ‘“‘command of the sea.” 
Belli’s concept of “limited command” is well suited to a fleet which 
does not have overall maritime superiority. Gorshkov is at pains to 
point out that this theory differs from the Mahanist concept of 
‘extensive command’’, achieved through battle or blockade. This is 
still reviled in Soviet doctrine and it is possible that Gorshkov has 
been accused of having Mahanist aspirations. 
COMMAND AND CONTROL 
In his analysis of the battle for sea communications in World War 
II, Gorshkov devotes one paragraph to aviation, half of which concen- 
trates on the question of subordination. He points out that the 
‘“‘aviation units which were included within fleet inventories operated 
significantly more effectively than those temporarily attached’’, and 
'08See ‘Command of the Sea in Soviet Naval Strategy,’’ Soviet Naval Policy, pp. 623-636. 
