121 
cites the German air force as a cautionary example. (72/11/27/3: 
101/2/5) He returns to this example in the final chapter, when he 
refers to the Germans’ failure to support submarine operations with 
aircraft and surface ships (73/2/20/8: 130/2/5). It is noticeable that 
apart from linking aviation with surface ships as a necessary adjunct 
to submarines, he does not discuss the requirement for aircraft, as 
he does for surface ships. He is however concerned to insure that 
all air support is subordinated to naval command. 
Gorshkov’s more serious concern is with ‘“‘authority to engage.” 
As he points out in his discussion of present-day operations, “‘delay 
in the employment of weapons in a naval battle or operation will 
inevitably be fraught with the most serious consequences, regardless 
of where the fleet is located, at sea or in port” (73/3/22/3: 132/1/1). 
This is a complex and highly sensitive problem, involving such issues 
as rules or engagement and the location of authority to use nuclear 
weapons. 
THE NEED FOR NAVAL POLICY 
As one of the eight points in his brief conclusions to the whole 
series, Gorshkov stresses the necessity of having a national policy 
which takes full account of the country’s need for seapower. Given 
an adequate economic capacity, it is this policy which then becomes 
the major factor, determining the type of fleet which is built and 
promoting the mobilization of the country’s resources to achieve the 
designated objective. Without such a policy, it is not possible for 
a country to develop seapower.!° 
The implication of this conclusion is that Gorshkov considers that 
Russia lacks such a coherent policy. This is supported by his critical 
remarks in the historical chapters about those who fail to understand 
the significance of seapower,'!® and his apparent dissatisfaction with 
the present structure of the Soviet Navy. I understand him to be 
saying that naval forces are not some all-purpose commodity which 
one buys by the ton, but that their type and quality stem directly 
from a country’s perception of its particular requirements for seapower 
and from the naval policy it decides to adopt. The Soviet leadership 
must therefore make a conscious decision on the future role of 
seapower in Soviet foreign policy. If naval forces are to become an 
important instrument of policy, then the navy must be tailored for 
the task. The peacetime exploitation of naval power cannot rely on 
the byproducts of a policy which is solely geared to nuclear-missile 
war. 
LIMITATION ON NAVAL ARMS AND OPERATIONS 
Gorshkov makes several references to the limitation of naval arma- 
ments. However, many of these can be seen as contributions to the 
central argument concerning the importance of navies and their politi- 
cal role in peacetime. He points out that it is precisely because they 
109 The exact wording of this conclusion is opaque. ““Given an adequate economic capacity, it is the 
policy, which takes into account the country’s need for seapower, which then becomes the important 
factor, determining the type of fleet which is built, promoting the mobilization of the country’s capa- 
bilities to achieve the designated objectives, and it is an indispensable condition for the development 
of seapower.”’ (73/2/24/: 134/2/2) 
10 72/3/20/2-21/1, 4/9/1, 22/9: 11/1/2-12/1/6, 25/1/1, 36/1/2. 
