123 
reached to complete negotiations within 12 months and there were 
fairly continuous discussions between November and the signing of 
the agreement at the end of May 1972. At this time, an agreement 
was also concluded, regulating the navigational behavior of Soviet 
and U.S. naval units when in company. 
It is difficult to know what to make of all this. I see the omission 
of any reference to Brezhnev’s proposal as significant, and think it 
may have some connection with the special emphasis Gorshkov gives 
to the Mediterranean in this series. For the rest, I am inclined to 
take much of what Gorshkov says at face value and to accept that 
many of his examples are intended, as he says, to emphasize the 
importance of navies. His discussion of Britain’s replacement by the 
United States contributes to the same aim, since it shows the source 
of America’s worldwide power; but it also serves a second purpose, 
since the two reasons he gives for Britain’s decline can be seen as 
favoring Russia in her struggle with the United States. She is on 
the same side as the “revolutionary and national freedom movements”’ 
and meanwhile, “‘the general crisis of capitalism continues to deepen.”’ 
This provides an argument against those who say that U.S. naval 
preponderance is too great, and Gorshkov, at least, has no doubts 
about the military-economic potential of the Soviet Union (73/2/19/6: 
129/2/4). 
There are other opinions. Shulsky considers that Gorshkov was wor- 
ried that some Soviet leaders might be willing to accept permanent 
naval inferiority in return for concessions in other areas, such as 
ground forces in Europe.''! Weinland considers that the SALT negotia- 
tions and the prospect of limitations on SSBN, had considerable in- 
fluence on both the content and the anomalies in publishing the 
articles. While I find Shulsky’s argument inherently plausible, I am 
less convinced by Weinland’s. In the run-up to SALT, the building 
rate of SSBN actually increased, presumably in order to achieve the 
highest possible ‘‘stand-still”’ level.1!2 Meanwhile, Gorshkov devotes 
very little discussion to the navy’s strategic strike role, either directly 
or by analogy (see appendix C). His emphasis throughout is on the 
“traditional” role of navies and he focuses primarily on the require- 
ment for balanced fleets and more surface ships. In this context, 
the concentration of resources on SSBN construction would militate 
against increased surface warship production and one might expect 
him to welcome a halt to the arms race in this area. 
"IA. N. Shulsky ““Gorshkov on Naval Arms Limitations: Kto Kogo?”, Center for Naval Analysis, 
Washington, working paper 2005-74-10, Jan. 24, 1975. While I find Shulsky’s line of argument per- 
suasive and his conclusions inherently plausible, I am less convinced by the link he adduces between 
Gorshkov’s discussion of naval arms conferences and the sigaing of SALT. He claims that the discus- 
sion is obviously out of place since the August article is headed “The Building of the (Soviet) Navy, 
1928-41". It is however difficult to see where else Gorshkov could have fitted the discussion in. The 
May article dealt with the First World War and the June article covered the period from the October 
Revolution to 1928. The latter contained five very disparate sections, the article was full length, and 
less than 1,000 words were devoted to “The Restoration of the Navy 1921-28,” which is a rather 
dull period. Meanwhile, the naval arms conferences spanned 1922-36 and were very much part of 
the international environment within which Soviet naval requirements were formulated in the 1930's. 
It would therefore seem perfectly logical to locate this general discussion about the naval arms race 
(which really only gathered speed in the thirties) at the beginning of this particular article. However, 
as Weinland suggests, the presence of the discussion in this article could provide a reason why the se- 
ries was interrupted in July to publish a special Navy Day article by Gorshkov; other explanations are 
also available. 
"2See “Current Soviet Warship Construction and Naval Weapons Development,’ Soviet Naval 
Policy, p. 427. This increase was achieved at the expense of the Charlie SSGN. 
