124 
The most persuasive overall explanation of Gorshkov’s argument 
is provided by Franklyn Griffiths.'1? He points out (as does Shulsky) 
that although at first glance Gorshkov appears to be opposed to arms 
control as such, he does in fact have several favorable things to 
say about it. Griffiths concludes that Gorshkov sees arms control 
as a useful tactic which can: (1) inhibit the naval development of 
a more powerful adversary; (2) permit a redirection of development 
and building program to reduce “‘waste”’; (3) seal off areas of competi- 
tion, such as the seabed; and (4) inhibit the growth of other branches 
of the armed forces. Griffiths goes on to suggest that Gorshkov’s 
general argument runs as follows. Naval claims for additional resources 
for surface warship construction are being resisted. Russia cannot 
obtain the necessary naval capability without altering the balance 
between existing programs and/or achieving cutbacks in the programs 
of the other armed services. The United States is now basically 
deterred and SALT can hold offensive weapons frozen at their present 
level; funds can thereby be released from within the naval budget, 
from the SRF and the Air Force, and (by accepting MBFR) from 
the Ground Forces in Europe. Arms control will not stop the arms 
race but it will allow the navy to obtain the appropriations needed 
for surface construction. 
THE MEDITERRANEAN 
Gorshkov devotes a 2,500-word chapter to the Mediterranean, 
which is the only area to receive this treatment (72/3/27-32: 17-21). 
It had already featured in the previous chapter ‘‘Russia’s Difficult 
Road to the Sea,’’ when he mentions that one of the main goals 
in 1877-78 was to gain ‘‘free access to the Mediterranean Sea” 
(72/3/21/6: 13/1/1/). He returns to the subject in his chapter on 
‘The Russian Navy During the Industrial Revolution and the Transi- 
tion from Sail to Steam,” which concentrates exclusively on the 
Crimean and Eighth Russo/Turkish Wars (72/4/14-15: 27-29). He 
points out that in the past Russia has always deployed naval forces 
into the Mediterranean when she has been threatened from the 
southwest, and that the threat from this direction has never been 
higher than it is today. Furthermore, Russia has a natural right to 
be in the Mediterranean, by virtue of her geographical location and 
her traditional usage of the sea which dates back to the 6th century 
(72/3/31/7-8: 20/2/2-3). Gorshkov is quite explicit about the nature 
of the threat, stating that the 6th Fleet ‘‘has as its basic mission 
a surprise attack against the Soviet Union and the countries of the 
Soviet community” and he goes on to quote the U.S. Navy as openly 
claiming that their aircraft carriers and submarines are “‘in a constant 
state of readiness to deliver nuclear strikes” targeted on Russia. 
He stresses that the Soviet squadron is not there in the Mediter- 
ranean for expansionist reasons, but “‘to nip aggression in the very 
bud,”’ and he goes on to defend the navy against Western charges 
of gunboat diplomacy (72/3/32/4: 20/2/4/-7). Shulsky makes the point 
that Gorshkov does not mention the protection of “‘state interests” 
as being part of the navy’s mission in the Mediterranean, but chooses 
to quote Brezhnev’s reference to a ‘‘policy of active defense of peace 
and the strengthening of international security’ (72/3/32/7: 21/2/3).'" 
‘3. Griffiths ““The Tactical Uses of Naval Arms Control’’, Soviet Naval Policy, pp. 643-5. 
"4Shulsky, Op.cit., p. 15 
