125 
Gorshkov returns to the Mediterranean again in the article-length 
chapter “‘Navies as an Instrument of the Aggressive Policy of the 
Imperialist States in Peacetime”’’, when he mentions the role of the 
6th Fleet in bringing pressure to bear on Cyprus, Italy, Greece and 
the Arab States (72/12/19/3: 117/2/3), and refers to its nuclear strike 
(and political blackmail) role against Russia (72/12/20/3: 118/2/3). 
The Mediterranean also features in the discussion of the continuing 
encroachment of U.S. naval power (notwithstanding the SALT agree- 
ment), which appears in the final chapter. Gorshkov comments “We 
cannot be indifferent” to the new base for the 6th Fleet in Greece, 
and for nuclear submarines in Maddelena Island (73/2/20/5: 130/2/2). 
However, in both chapters these references are matched by examples 
from other sea areas. 
If we take the Mediterranean and the Black Sea together, between 
them they comprise 10 percent of the whole series; this figure does 
not include any references to these areas in the chapters discussing 
the two world wars and the Soviet Navy in the interwar years. Gorsh- 
kov has of course a special link with the Black Sea Fleet, having 
served with that command continuously from 1941 to 1955, when 
he relinquished his appointment as commander-in-chief, to go to 
Moscow as acting commander-in-chief of the Soviet Navy. Kasatanov, 
who was First Deputy commander-in-chief of the navy 1964-74, took 
over from Gorshkov as commander-in-chief Black Sea Fleet in 1955, 
and remained there until he went to the Northern Fleet at the start 
of the shift to forward deployment in 1962. 
It seems clear that Gorshkov attaches a special significance to the 
Black Sea and the Mediterranean, as well he might. The Black Sea 
provides direct access to Russia’s industrial heartland, bypassing the 
natural barriers of rivers and space which wore down the armies 
of Napoleon and Hitler. Gorshkov points out that the lack of Russian 
naval power allowed the intervention of British and French forces 
in the Crimean War and again in support of the forces opposing 
the revolution during the civil war. He also draws the historical lesson 
that while the Russian Black Sea Fleet could achieve naval supremacy 
over the other Black Sea powers, it lost this as soon as external 
maritime powers intervened. The answer to this problem lies in gaining 
control of the exits, an objective sought by the Russians for the 
last 150 years; this underlay the basing of submarines on Valona 
from 1958 until 1961, when Albania broke with the Soviet Union.'!® 
Meanwhile, a new strategic threat had emerged of direct attacks on 
Russia from the eastern Mediterranean, which lies as close to Moscow 
as does the Barents Sea, but is of course much closer to the industrial 
heartland. 
The political leadership’s appreciation of this threat is evidenced 
by the past decison to embark on maintaining a squadron in the 
Mediterranean. What they may not have realized was the extent to 
which the operational effectiveness of the deployment would be de- 
"5 Herrick quotes a remark by Kulish to the effect that the Soviet Union would take the Turkish 
Straits in a war by the army and navy attacking from both ends simultaneously. Kulish, who was head 
of the international relations department of IMEMO, made this remark in a conversation with R. B. 
Foster, who is Director of Strategic Studies at Stanford Research Institute. The navy’s role would also 
be to prevent the arrival of Western reinforcements by sea. 
