126 
pendent on access to port facilities and airfields in the area, with 
all the overtones of expansionism and imperalist aggression. In his 
discussion of the vital importance of the Mediterranean to the security 
of the Russian homeland, Gorshkov seems to be making two separate 
points. On the one hand, he is insisting on the navy’s role in defending 
against this particular threat; and on the other, he is covering himself 
against the charge that the political costs of the deployment are to 
high. 
Gorshkov’s silence about Brezhnev’s suggestion ot mutual restric- 
tions on naval operations is deafening. The Mediterranean would be 
a prime candidate for such restrictions, which could be seen as work- 
ing to Russia’s disadvantage. U.S. naval strike forces could reenter 
the Mediterranean at short notice with relative ease, whereas the 
Black Sea exits are a different matter.'!® Meanwhile, the Soviet Navy 
would have lost its position on the far side of the exits, which is 
sO important to insuring their seizure in war. For Russia, the Mediter- 
ranean is the antechamber to the Black Sea, with the Turkish Straits 
as the intervening door; as a Black Sea power the Soviet Union 
is also a Mediterranean power (72/2/32/6: 21/2/2). 
OCEAN RESOURCES AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 
The first half of the last article comprises a chapter entitled ““Some 
Problems in Mastering the World Ocean” (73/2/13-18: 123-128). 
Doubts have already been expressed as to whether the last article 
was planned as part of the original series. But in any case, the style 
and content of this particular chapter make it fairly certain that it 
_ was written by a different author than the rest of the series. 
The article points to the growing importance of the world ocean 
as a resource and hence as an area of conflict. It also sets out 
the contemporary official position concerning the state of maritime 
law and Russia’s approach to the forthcoming Conference on the 
Law of the Sea.'!!7 In most respects the Soviet position was similar 
to that of the traditional maritime powers with an emphasis on 
freedom of the seas and the limitation of national jurisdiction to 
12 miles from shore. The article’s discussion of the position held 
by the less developed countries (the group of 77) is forceful, self- 
righteous and undiplomatic. 
The question then arises as to why this chapter was included. It 
doesn’t really fit in with the rest of the series, it is not detailed 
enough to provide guidance for officers in warships visiting foreign 
ports, and its tone could offend countries in the Third World. Part 
of the chapter can perhaps be explained as “threat inflation,” provid- 
ing yet another reason for a powerful and well-balanced fleet with 
a high proportion of surface ships, but if that were its major purpose 
it is poorly done. 
The more likely explanation seems to be that the navy’s interests 
were closely involved in narrow territorial waters and free transit 
through straits, and that a softening of the Soviet position on these 
issues was under discussion, in order to make it more acceptable 
6 See B. Blechman “‘Soviet Interests in Naval Arms Control: prospects for disengagement in the 
Mediterranean’’, Soviet Naval Developments, pp. 531-3. 
"7See R. L. Friedheim and M. E. Jehn ‘“‘The Soviet Position at the Third U.N. Law of the Sea 
Conference,"’ Soviet Naval Policy, pp. 351-6. 
