127 
to the less developed countries. By 1972 there was growing evidence 
that the assertive behavior of Soviet fishing fleets was damaging Soviet 
relations with an increasing number of countries, particularly in the 
Third World. In the spring of 1973 the Soviet Union did in fact 
modify its root and branch opposition to the 200-mile Economic Zone 
concept and advanced certain compromise proposals concerning fish- 
ing rights in these areas; I also understand that in private discussions 
Soviet representatives have indicated that the insistence on free transit 
only applies to certain straits.!!8 
The three groups which would be most severely affected by such 
a shift in Soviet poisition would be the navy, the fishing industry 
and the ocean science community. The fishing industry in particular, 
with its vast capital investment in distant water fleets would welcome 
support from the navy, with whom there is only limited competition 
for shipbuilding resources. 
THE TWO SIDES OF THE ARGUMENT ABOUT SEA POWER 
Gorshkov’s advocacy of a powerful Soviet Navy was published in 
the course of a wide-ranging debate about fundamental issues of 
foreign and domestic policy, and about the dangers of war and the 
future roles of the armed services. Seemingly inconsequential parts 
of the series make good sense if we allow that in addition to his 
main argument, he is making a substantial number of debating points 
which he feels will help his cause.'!® These fall into four main cate- 
gories: (1) he seeks to reassure those who have doubts about his 
argument, but are still uncommitted; (2) he hopes to rally support 
by emphasizing doctrinal respectability; (3) he is concerned to rebut 
earlier attacks on the case he is presenting; and (4) he attacks by 
analogy certain key assumptions held by his opponents. 
These various points, embedded in 54,000 words of sustained argu- 
ment, provide a window on to the wider debate and, with Gorshkov 
as a constant factor in the analysis, allow one to draw certain in- 
ferences as to how opinion divided on these particular issues, in terms 
of “attitudes” rather than interest groups or institutions. In listing 
these attitudes, it is not implied that any one person (including Gorsh- 
kov) held all these opinions. Gorshkov was defending the navy’s case 
and he would use every argument which would elicit support, even 
if he had doubts about its validity. Nevertheless, these listings do 
give some indication of how interests and attitudes might cluster on 
the wider issues, and cleavages of opinion would appear to exist 
within groups as well as between them. I have made no attempt 
to be comprehensive and the opposing lists are not meant to be 
symmetrical. All the attitudes shown on Gorshkov’s side are derived 
from his articles, but there will be others which he has not brought 
out, as being irrelevant to his case. The range of attitudes under 
Gorshkov’s opponents is somewhat wider and is inferred both from 
the content and the fact of Gorshkov’s argument. I have, however, 
only included antitheses where this seemed justified by the analysis. 
"8In addition to the straits which control her fleet exits, Russia has a vital interest in passage 
through the Indonesian archipelago. In the event of war with China, the supply and reinforcement of 
her Far Eastern front would have to rely heavily on shipping, since the Trans-Siberian railway would 
be under continuous attack. 
"9 MccGwire (CNA), pp. 42-44. 
