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POTENTIAL SUPPORTERS 
A—Attitudes 
Those who believed that: 
military power decides the outcome of all international rela- 
tions; 
mutual deterrence permits greater freedom of military action; 
the navy is an important instrument of state policy in peacetime; 
Soviet forces should be used directly to curb imperialist aggres- 
sion in local wars; 
imperialist aggression is on the rise and will extend to ocean 
resources; 
the risk of escalation from local to nuclear war is low; 
the danger of nuclear war with the West continues to be real; 
expenditure on defense must come before all else; 
if nuclear war comes, political objectives can still be achieved 
in the post-exchange period; 
the navy has an important role in general war; 
arms control should be used to gain advantage in the naval 
arms race; 
a balanced fleet is essential; 
the Soviet Union requires a worldwide maritime capability; 
freedom of the high seas is important to Soviet interests; 
national jurisdiction should not extend beyond 12 miles from 
the coast. 
Those who were against: 
the withdrawal from Egypt; 
accommodation and detente with the West. 
B—Institutions and Interests 
The Party Ideologues; 
The State Security Apparatus; 
The Fishing Industry; 
The Ocean Science Community. 
LIKELY OPPONENTS 
A—Attitudes 
Those who believed that: 
detente is beneficial to Russia; 
Western technology and trade is important to the U.S.S.R.; 
military power has limited utility as an instrument of state policy 
outside the Soviet bloc; 
arms control and limitations should be pursued for their own 
sake; 
an assertive naval policy has been counterproductive; 
the risks of nuclear war are high; 
political objectives could not be achieved after nuclear war; 
the danger of a deliberate U.S. attack is negligible; 
Soviet/U.S. confrontation risks nuclear war; 
protracted war at sea is impractical; 
Those who wanted to: 
give priority to the domestic economy over defense 
give priority to good relations with Third World countries; 
