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aline the Soviet position on the Law of the Sea closer to Third 
World interests; 
reduce the Soviet Union’s physical presence in the Third World. 
Those who were concerned about: 
the diplomatic isolation of the U.S.S.R.; 
the ideological implications of naval intervention; 
the costs of forward deployment; 
the political costs of foreign bases; 
the economic costs of a large navy. 
Those who believed that the navy’s tasks could be discharged: 
mainly by nuclear submarines and aircraft; 
in large part by strategic surveillance and shore-based missiles. 
B—Institutions and Interests 
The Intellectual Defense Establishment; 
Some of the professional naval strategists; 
The Merchant Fleet; 
Elements of the Domestic Economy. 
C— Individuals 
Brezhnev— proposal to limit naval operations, June 1971; 
Grechko—Navy Day article in ‘“‘Morskoj sbornik,”’ July 1971. 
The gravamen of the charges which underlie Gorshkov’s argument, 
and the level to which they are addressed, is suggested by three 
short, self-contained paragraphs which stand out from the review of 
“The Leninist Principles of Soviet Military Science.’’ As noted earlier, 
these comprise an out-of-context section of the fifth article, which 
was signed to typesetting in mid-April. This was at the time of 
Kissinger’s visit to prepare for the Moscow summit, and 3 months 
before the withdrawal from Egypt. 
Like a red thread, the idea runs through all Lenin’s directives, 
letters and orders concerning the need for firmness and purpose- 
fulness in carrying out intended plans, and of the falseness of 
any kind of wavering and indecisiveness at the crucial moments 
of the struggle. (72/6/14/8:56/1/4) 
“The supremacy of the policy of the Communist Party must 
be openly acknowledged,” (qv. Lenin) in the actions of all of 
the organs of the Soviet state, including the military organ. 
(14/3:55/2/3) 
[Lenin] considered the principle of one-man _ leadership 
‘‘(Edinonachilie),”’ centralism, and unity of will from top to bot- 
tom to be the basis of correct and goal-oriented leadership. 
(15/4:56/2/3) 
THE SUBSTANCE REVIEWED 
Gorshkov covers a very broad field in his articles, much of which 
has not been touched on here. The dominant theme of his argument 
is the importance of naval forces as an instrument of state policy 
in peacetime and their effect on the course and outcome of wars 
of all kind; what is more, this importance is increasing. Seapower 
is a necessary adjunct to great power status, which cannot be sustained 
without a powerful fleet. But naval forces must be shaped in response 
