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to specific requirements, and this demands a conscious policy concern- 
ing the role of seapower in the nations’ specific plans. The Soviet 
Union lacks such a policy. In consequence, it has an unbalanced 
fleet, tailored for general war, and biased heavily toward submarine 
and shore-based aircraft. If the Soviet Union is to exploit the potential 
of seapower as an instrument of state policy, the navy must have 
a greatly improved worldwide general-purpose capability and be pro- 
vided with a broader range of surface ship types (possibly including 
aircraft carriers), and effective afloat support. The Soviet Union has 
the economic and industrial capacity to build and sustain such a 
navy. 
While we can identify Gorshkov’s line of argument with some con- 
fidence, and have a general idea of why he is advancing it, it is 
much harder to know his own preferences on individual issues. He 
was, after all, concerned to gather a coalition in support of his main 
objectives, and was probably willing to incorporate other proposals 
if they reinforced his main argument, and brought additional support 
to his cause. Take for example his advocacy of an increased naval 
role in peacetime. This provides an argument in support of more 
surface ships and a better balanced fleet—but creates problems for 
the navy if the role is increased before additional ships become availa- 
ble. 
One short-term preference can be identified with some certainty. 
Gorshkov was strongly opposed to the withdrawal from Egypt, both 
on the basis of what he has to say about the Mediterranean and 
because of the potential and actual operational penalties. His likely 
attitude toward a more assertive peacetime role is much harder to 
determine. Whatever Gorshkov’s long-term aspirations, there are likely 
to have been more immediate concerns about the navy being asked 
to do too much with too few ships, about the dangers of exposed 
deployments without adequate shore support, and about the political 
(and military) risks of physical interposition with insufficient or in- 
adequate forces. Nevertheless, the usefulness of surface ships had 
to be demonstrated, otherwise the trend would probably worsen. 
Moving to the longer term, does Gorshkov really believe in 
protracted war at sea, or was this another way of enlisting support? 
It is hard to tell. However, although the nature of wars and the 
assignment of missions and roles are central to the wider debate, 
the immediate crux of Gorshkov’s argument is likely to have been 
the allocation of resources to future naval construction. 
By 1971, decisions in principle are likely to have been taken on 
the type and scale of new construction for delivery beginning about 
1980, and on the production runs for the rest of the seventies. We 
do not know what Gorshkov asked for in the way of new construction, 
but to meet its expanding role and remedy existing deficiencies, the 
navy would have needed a substantial increase. Current construction 
reflects old decisions, and we will have to wait several more years 
for shipyard evidence of what was decided. But the indications are 
